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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Survey of On-line Security practices 
Computer automated power system security practices in the 
United States are reviewed in a recent IEEE paper (1) written 
by the Current Operations problems Working Group of IEEE's 
Systems Operations Subcommittee. Security monitoring is 
limited to steady state performance considerations only. The 
system is monitored, and a static state estimation process 
describes the entire system state. An interactive 
dispatcher's load-flow program is used with a list of selected 
contingencies to assess the suitability of the system 
operating states under these contingencies. Reports are made 
to the operator when it is ascertained that the operating 
conditions, in the event of specific contingencies, would 
exceed prescribed limits for bus voltages or line flows. 
A similar survey by the System planning and Operations 
Committee No. 32-12 of CIGRE (1972) (2) reports on the various 
security monitoring schemes of the member systems throughout 
rhe world. The most common basis for analysis is calculation 
of power flows and short circuit levels. Some of the systems 
use transient stability analysis data, but these attempts at 
assessing transient stability use precalculated limits and 
attempt to infer the suitability of the transient response by 
inspecting the steady state power flow parameters. 
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In Japan, a security monitoring scheme (3,4) of the Tokyo 
Electric Pov/er Company uses a procedure that runs a series of 
operating limit checks. The operating limits are computed 
using a contingency evaluation procedure that selects 
contingencies from a prepared list and applies a variety of 
on-line computer methods for analysis. An important aspect of 
this scheme is that it assesses the transient behavior of the 
power system as well as the suitability of the 
post-disturbance performance. Another scheme proposed by the 
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (5) is designed to evaluate 
the so called "dynamic reliability" with a procedure which 
takes into account the probability of cascading failure 
introduced by a primary disturbance. 
In Canada, the Ontario Hydro System uses precalculated 
stability studies to determine stability limits for certain 
network configurations. Computer monitoring schemes are used 
to ascertain which limits apply to the current configuration, 
and to assess whether these limits are being approached (6). 
In summary, it is clear that computer-automated security 
assessment is in its infancy. Schemes currently in use depend 
primarily on tools developed as power systems planning 
procedure, and the schemes attempt assessment by inspecting 
steady state aspects of the power system. When transient 
behavior of a power system is considered, only precalculated 
limits are used. 
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The Operating States of a Power System 
In introductory work by Dyliacco in 1968 (7), power 
system operation was divided into four operating modes : 
Normal, Alert, Emergency, and Restorative. In 1978, Fink and 
Carlsen (8) expanded this concept by identifying a fifth 
operating mode (In extremis), and proposing, for each mode, 
identification of equality and inequality constraints 
satisfied or violated. The operating states they gave are: 
1. Normal: All constraints are satisfied; reserve 
margins are adequate to withstand stresses. 
2. Alert: All constraints are still satisfied; 
reserve margins are such that some disturbance 
could result in a violation of some inequality 
constraint. 
3. Emergency: Inequality constraints are violated; 
system is still intact and control action could be 
initiated to restore system to at least the alert 
state. 
4. In extremis; Equality constraints and inequality 
constraints are violated; the system will nc longer 
be intact and a portion of the load will be lost. 
5. Restorative: Control action is being taken to pick 
up the lost load and to reconnect the system. 
Current Issues to be Resolved 
To be truly responsive to the needs of the system 
operator, automated (or dynamic) security assessment must 
monitor the states of the system, compute limits, and assess 
security, according to the system configuration that exists at 
that time. The methodology for this dynamic security 
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assessment must deal specifically with a transition from 
normal to clert and emergency states. The emphasis must be on 
alerting the system operator to potential situations in which 
breaches of security may occur. This should be done 
continually, with computations performed in near-real time to 
give the operator the opportunity to take any preventive 
measures he should deem necessary. Development of such a 
methodology, however, requires that three fundamental issues 
be resolved. These questions (9-11) reflect serious obstacles 
that need to be overcome; 
1. System security is not well-defined. It deals with 
the transition of the power system, under the 
influence of a disturbance, from one operating 
state to another. Assessment of this transition 
requires : 
An assessment of the final state (or steady 
state response) of the system, which requires 
a definition of acceptable and unacceptable 
post-disturbance operating conditions. 
An assessment of the system transient 
response, which requires a definition of what 
constitutes an acceptable transient 
performance. 
2. procedures for executing both types of assessments 
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must be developed. Suitable analysis procedures 
and reporting criteria must be developed into an 
integrated assessment package. 
3. Analysis of power system behavior has traditionally 
been conducted in a systems planning environment. 
Repetitive techniques are used to carefully isolate 
individual problem conditions before considering 
remedial action; the technique is used to assure 
the validity of the resulting design decisions. 
On-line system analysis, however, must detect 
weaknesses and suggest remedial action without 
repetitive search to isolate individual problems; a 
valid basis for decision-making must be developed 
directly. This requires development of a new 
methodology specifically designed to yield 
information that is valid for decision-making 
during system operation. 
A successful methodology, therefore, must be capable of; 
o Offering a clear definition of what constitutes 
acceptable system performance, thus establishing a 
criterion for failure 
o Recognizing the states of the system in near-real 
time 
o Detecting situations that may lead to emergencies 
o Assessing the security of the system in terms 
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meaningful to the system operator 
o Identifying the weaknesses of the system and 
suggesting preventive measures 
Steady State and Transient Responses 
The key to computer-automated security assessment appears 
to be emerging as the process of evaluating the suitability of 
the current operating conditions in terms of the many possible 
contingencies which that system might have to face. The 
quality of the response to these contingencies is evaluated in 
terms of: 
1. Whether in the post-disturbance operating state 
(steady-state response) all constraints (equality 
and inequality) are satisfied, and 
2. Whether the transient response threatens the 
system's integrity. These threats are primarily in 
terms of: 
o Loss of lines due to relaying 
o Shedding of loads by underfrequency relays 
o Loss of synchronism of one or more generators 
o In extreme situations, system islanding and 
cascading outages. 
An unsuitable transient response might be possible even though 
the post-disturbance operating states are suitable; likewise, 
a suitable transient response might be possible even though 
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the post-disturbance state does not satisfy its limiting 
constraints. 
The Margin Concept 
The quality of the system response can be dealt with in 
terms of a margin of acceptable operation. The margin reports 
the degree to which the equality and inequality constraints 
are approached. Performance margins are the parameters an 
operator is likely to watch in monitoring the status of the 
system. Margins are in common use in the analysis of power 
system security in terms of equality and inequality 
constraints; additionally, the concept is implied in most 
approaches. The literature in this area is vast and only a 
small representative sample will be cited. A number of 
authors (12-15) deal with analysis of power dispatch in terms 
of meeting the network constraints. Carver et al. (16) 
calculated the load-supplying capability of the 
generator-transmission network. optimization techniques using 
linear programming are given by some authors to develop 
optimal scheduling from the security standpoint (17). 
Rescheduling of generators and loads in an emergency is dealt 
with by Chan and Schweppe (18) and Blaschak et al. (19); while 
jarjis and Galiana (20) calculated the steady-state stability 
limit for a given set of network constraints, venikov et al. 
(21) used load flow analysis to identify operating regions 
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permissible under steady state stability constraints. Ohkubo, 
Takeda, and umeura (22) proposed a steady state stability 
"test index" to evaluate load conditions and interconnection 
strength. 
In contrast to steady state conditions, the transient 
response cannot be quantified in terms of simple equality and 
inequality constraints. Most techniques attempt to identify 
the quality of the transient response in terms of transient 
stability limits or critical clearing times, while a few 
authors have introduced transient stability indices. In 1970, 
Tiechgaeber et al. (23) proposed a parameter which measures 
the relative transient stability of a power system by direct 
methods. Rahimi et al. (24) defined transient stability 
indices based on the concept of potential and kinetic 
energies. Kuruganty and Billington (25) used a probabilistic 
technique to develop a single index of transient stability of 
the overall system, while Ribbens-Pavella et al, (26) 
introduced a transient stability index using a Lyapunov-1ike 
or iteria. 
Though the margin concept is easily defined, it is seldom 
used in assessing the transient response of the power system. 
Recently, a few authors have suggested using a margin for 
assessing the transient behavior. Di Caprio (27) and Di 
Capprio and Ribbens-pave11a (28) used a classical model of a 
multi-area power system in using direct methods to determine 
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maximum values of perturbation allowable in each area before 
loss of synchronism; the allowable perturbations were then 
used to identify a stability margin. Fouad (29) proposed the 
use of the stability margin concept to deal with multiple 
disturbances and suggested that the allov;able perturbations 
can be related to either load (generation) changes or network 
changes. The concept of a transient stability margin also 
appeared in the Soviet literature as a means of assessing 
transient system behavior (30). 
Review of Direct Methods of Transient Stability Analysis 
Assessing transient stability by accounting for transient 
energy is currently the central focus of direct methods of 
transient stability analysis. For many years there has been a 
great interest in using these direct methods of analysis (see 
(31) for a comprehensive review). These methods all attempt 
to develop a special function by which the stability of the 
post-disturbance system can be examined; this function is used 
to identify a region of stability. A system is stable if, at 
the end of the disturbance (e.g., the instant of fault 
clearing), the system trajectory is within this region of 
stability. Usually, the region of stability is conservative; 
instability is not assured when the trajectory, at the end of 
the disturbed period, is outside the region of stability. 
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Direct methods of transient stability analysis have 
received a great deal of attention by investigators. Early 
investigators used functions that described system energy 
(31,32,33). Later, Lyapunov-type functions were suggested; 
more recently, energy-type functions are again being used 
(34,35) . 
The assessment of transient stability using direct 
methods has generally produced predictions that are too 
conservative for practical use. The determination of the 
region of stability has generally been recognized as the major 
cause of the conservative results. In general, determination 
of this region is inferred by using the unstable equilibrium 
point (UEP). In early work, the region.of stability was 
determined by considering the UEP nearest to the stable 
equilibrium point (SEP). Later efforts have focused on 
determining a more appropriate UEP, based upon the particular 
disturbance under consideration (36,37,34). 
One such method, developed by System Control, Inc. (SCI), 
inspects the motion of a disturbed system and uses the 
accelerations and the first derivatives of accelerations to 
determine which UEP is approached by the fault-on trajectory. 
The technique uses an energy function that is derived from the 
dynamic equation that describes the motion of the machine 
rotors relative to the system's inertial center. This energy 
function is used to calculate the system's critical energy and 
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the system's fault transient energy; stability is assessed by 
the comparison of the two (34). This method, called the 
energy function method, provides the energy function used in 
this project. 
Improvements to the Energy Function Method 
As with the other methods of direct stability analysis, 
SCI's energy function method has not yet proven sufficiently 
reliable for practical application. The method often fails to 
predict the mode of instability that is actually encountered 
by the critical disturbance. Though the concepts behind the 
energy function method seem sound, predictions based on a UEP 
of the fault-on trajectory often produce excessively 
conservative energies. Furthermore, when there are more than 
one infinitely large inertias (e.g., lumped equivalents of 
machines outside the study area), the method often fails to 
converge to and identify a UEP. On the other hand, the energy 
function method occasionally produces excellent results, well 
within the accuracy necessary for practical use. The method, 
itself, and in particular the function used, seems 
particularly suitable for potential use as a practical direct 
method of stability analysis. 
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Scope of This project 
This project deals with developing a tool for assessing 
the quality of the transient response ; this is done in terms 
of the loss of synchronism of one or more generators. The 
project also illustrates the potential of this tool in 
assessing the degree of robustness (or vulnerability) of a 
power system. 
The approach is to develop a tool that assesses the 
quality of the system transient response to a disturbance in 
terms of an energy margin for acceptable behavior. This 
margin will characterize the quality of the transient response 
as the system moves from its pre-disturbance operating 
condition to its post-disturbance operating condition. 
In exploring the energy function method, and in 
developing the concept of the transient energy margin, this 
research found it necessary to develop a fundamental 
understanding of the issues associated with the use of direct 
methods of stability analysis. Careful analysis of system 
trajectories following a large disturbance has contributed 
valuable information on: the concept of a controlling UEP, 
the manner in which some machines tend to lose synchronism, 
and the various components of system transient energy. A 
significant contribution to the state-of-the-art in this 
subject has been made by clearly identifying the components of 
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transient energy directly responsible for system separation. 
In assessing the quality of the transient response, a 
distinction is made between assessing system stability and 
assessing system security. ' The first part of this 
dissertation (Chapters 4-6) focuses on assessing transient 
stability; Chapter 7 focuses on assessing security. A 
transient energy margin profile is developed for a given 
operating condition. This profile is used for assessment. 
The procedure used is to compute a transient energy margin for 
various fault contingencies. Faults are placed at various 
pre-chosen locations within the study system and various 
breaker operations (or failures) are assumed in clearing the 
fault. The process is repeated for other hypothetical 
disturbances from the same initial operating condition. The 
transient energy margin is then normalized, ranked, and 
examined for potentially unacceptable situations. The result 
is a transient energy margin profile of the system at its 
current operating condition. 
Throughout, the project simulation and validation studies 
were conducted on two power networks; a 4-generator, 11-bus, 
system, and on a 17-generator, 163-bus, system. The latter is 
a reduced version of the actual power network of the State of 
Iowa. 
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CHAPTER 2. TRANSIENT STABILITY ANALYSIS USING THE ENERGY 
FUNCTION 
Discussion of Transient Stability 
In a small power system subjected to a large disturbance, 
the motion of the synchronous machines is simple to 
understand. A disturbance, such as a fault or an abrupt 
switching of significant loads, creates a power imbalance at 
each machine. The electrical power transmitted out to the 
system does not equal the net mechanical power that drives the 
generator. The mismatch between "power-out" and "power-in" 
accelerates (or decelerates) the generators. At the beginning 
of the disturbance, the generator rotors are at their 
pre-fault steady state operating state, i.e., at their stable 
equilibrium point (SEP). Following the disturbance, the 
rotors will seek new equilibrium positions. Usually the 
pre-fault and post-fault equilibrium positions are different. 
They are referred as the stable equilibrium points (SEPs). The 
transient response of the system is the motion (or 
trajectories) of the rotors as they move from the pre-fault 
SEP and attempt to settle at the post-fault SEP. 
A fault condition introduces an initial fault-on period 
during which a portion of the transmission system is disabled, 
substantially reducing the power output of some generators. 
During this period the imbalance between power-in and 
power-out for these generators is particularly severe, and the 
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machines are rapidly accelerated (or decelerated) away from 
the pre-fault SEP. At clearing, the post-fault system 
configuration is established, resulting in restorative forces 
that draw the generators toward their post-fault SEP. The 
system seeks this post-fault SEP, starting from a condition at 
clearing, where the machines are in motion and not at 
equilibrium. Some machines may have very advanced angles and 
may be moving rapidly. To reach a post-fault stable 
equilibrium condition, these machines must decelerate and 
reach zero velocity at a time when the forces tend to return 
the generator to the SEP. 
The process by which the restoring forces slow the moving 
rotors is primarily one of converting kinetic energy (KE) into 
potential energy. (A relatively small amount of KE is 
converted into dissipative losses; as is common in the 
literature, this dissipative component is included when using 
the term potential energy.) If the restoring forces 
everywhere succeed in slowing the generators and returning 
them toward the SEP, stability will be achieved; in such cases 
the kinetic energy is successfully converted into potential 
energy. 
It is possible, however, that the high velocities and 
advanced rotor positions existing at clearing may be large 
enough to cause one or more generators to be subjected to 
forces that are no longer in the direction of the SEP, but are 
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in a direction to accelerate those generators away from the 
rest of the system. In this case, not all of the kinetic 
energy is successfully converted into potential energy, and 
synchronism is not maintained, causing instability. 
Assessing Stability by Energy Accounting 
In assessing the stability of the transient response, we 
inspect the transition between the pre-fault SEP and the 
post-fault SEP and attempt to ascertain that no generators 
would lose synchronism with the rest of the system. As an 
alternative, we can ascertain whether the system will 
successfully convert the kinetic energy into potential energy. 
To assess the stability of the transient response by 
direct methods, current research has focused on techniques 
that account for system energy. A disturbance is seen as an 
event that injects energy into the system. The energy at the 
instant of clearing is the fault transient energy, For 
the system to remain stable, this fault energy must be 
absorbed as potential energy. The post-disturbance system, 
however, is seen as having a limit to its ability to absorb 
potential energy. Direct methods of stability analysis 
attempt to compute this limit, called the critical energy 
(Vg^), and compare it with the energy introduced by the fault 
(Vci). The system is stable if the fault energy is within the 
system's potential-energy-absorbing capacity; 
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Ver > 
On the other hand, the system is unstable if the fault energy 
exceeds the potential-energy-absorbing capacity: 
Vcr < 
The Equal-Area Criterion 
Direct methods of assessing transient stability by 
accounting for system energy can be illustrated by using the 
well-known equal-area criterion for a one-machine-infinite-
bus system. Figure 2-1 shows the power-angle curve with 
pre-fault, faulted, and post-fault networks represented. The 
S1 
rotor position 0 represents the pre-fault SEP. The angle 
S 2 0 is the post-fault SEP that the system is attempting to 
réach. The angle 9^ is the unstable equilibrium point (UEP) 
at which the restorative forces are zero and beyond which 
power-in exceeds power-out; 0^ is the point-of-no-return 
beyond which the system goes unstable. 
The area of the power angle curve represents energy; the 
area between the SEP (0^^) and the UEP (0^), 
represents the maximum potential energy storage capacity of 
c 1 
the post-fault system. If 0 is the fault clearing angle, 
area represents the transient kinetic energy stored in the 
motion of the disturbed generator (at the clearing instant), 
while A^ represents the potential energy stored by virtue of 
the advanced rotor position (at clearing). The area A^ is the 
potential energy storing capacity of the system remaining at 
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POSTFAULT-:*^ 
PREFAULT 
FAULTED 
max 
Figure 2-1. Energy margin for one-machine-infinite bus 
system 
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the instant of clearing. As the rotor velocity decreases (but 
the angle increases) after clearing, kinetic energy is 
converted into potential energy. That is, the kinetic energy, 
, is stored as'potential energy, A^. The maximum angle 
©max occurs when all of the kinetic energy is converted to 
potential energy (i.e., when A^r between and G^^*, 
equals A^). The limiting case for transient stability is 
reached when 8^^* and the UEP, , coincide. 
Direct energy methods of stability analysis attempt to 
compute the fault transient energy (V^^) clearing, A^+A^f 
and the critical energy (V^ )^ / A^ +A^  (extending to 0*^ ) ; if 
the fault energy is less than the critical energy, the system 
is stable. 
This simple qualitative picture is the basis for many 
attempts to analyze power system stability using direct 
methods. The quantitative description of the system energy, 
particularly the critical energy, has been the subject of 
extensive investigation for many years (31). 
More Complex Systems 
To assess the transient stability of more complex 
systems, using direct methods, it is necessary to extrapolate 
the one-machine-infinite-bus concepts to larger dimensions. 
This extrapolation, it seems, is quite difficult to 
accomplish. The n-machine system will introduce n angles in 
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the angle space and n velocities in the velocity space. 
Therefore, the extrapolation from one machine to n machines 
will introduce 2n degrees of freedom (including time). This 
introduces the conceptual complexities of 2n-dimensional 
space; it is difficult to visualize the physical meaning 
behind the 2n-dimensional mathematics. Direct methods require 
proper accounting of energy in this 2n-space, as well as 
proper interpretation of the meaning attached to this energy. 
Transient Kinetic Energy and the Inertial Center 
One fundamental step in accounting for the energy 
contributing to system separation is the so-called 
center-of-inertia formulation of the system equations. (This 
formulation is also referred to in the literature as 
center-of-angle.) In the center-of-inertia formulation, the 
equations describing the motion of the synchronous machines 
are formulated with respect to a fictitious inertial center; 
this is in contrast to the usual situation where the machine's 
equations are formulated with respect to a synchronously 
moving frame of reference. The effect is to describe only the 
excursions of the generators with respect to a central 
grouping (i.e., the center-of-inertia). The importance of 
this formulation lies in clearly focusing on the motion that 
tends to separate one or more generators from the rest of the 
system, and thus removing a substantial component of system 
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transient energy that does not contribute to instability, 
namely, the energy that accelerates the inertial center 
(38,39). With the centar-of-inertia formulation, the forces 
tending to separate some generators from the rest of the 
system (and the energy associated with these forces) can be 
easily identified (34,35). 
Potential Energy Surfaces and the Critical Energy 
The process of extrapolating the equal-area criterion 
from the one-machine-infinite-bus system into an n-bus system 
is a task of significant complexity. The following simplified 
picture seems to emerge from recent research (34,40,41,42). 
In the one-machine-infinite-bus system, the position of the 
machine rotor had a specific corresponding potential energy. 
In the n-machine system, each rotor position likewise 
corresponds to a specific energy, but with n machines, the 
energy becomes a function of n dimensions. The total system 
potential energy is visualized as an n-dimensioned potential 
energy terrain. The stable equilibrium point is the minimum 
energy point in this n-dimensioned space. Every point in the 
angle space has an energy associated with it. The entire 
space represents all possible positions of the generators. 
Three-Dimensional Energy Terrain 
To help visualize the energy in an n-dimensioned space, 
the introduction of a three-dimensional case is useful, A 
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three-machine energy terrain is depicted in Figure 2-2. In 
the horizontal plane, one axis shows the relative angle 
between machines one and three, and the other axis shows the 
relative angle between machines two and three; the vertical 
axis shows potential energy. The energy contours are lines of 
equal potential energy. The point marked "SEP" is the 
post-disturbance stable equilibrium position (corresponding to 
S 2 0 in Figure 2-1). It is also taken as the zero energy 
datum. The energy terrain appears as a valley with the SEP at 
the lowest point. The valley is surrounded by hills of 
varying elevation. The energy terrain represents the energy 
values of all possible rotor positions that the system could 
have. 
The ability of the post-disturbance system to convert 
fault energy into potential energy depends on the particular 
trajectory a disturbance produces, that is, the potential 
energy that the system absorbs depends upon the particular 
segment of the terrain that the trajectory traverses. As the 
trajectory passes parallel to the energy contours, little or 
no fault energy is converted to potential energy by the change 
in rotor positions. As the trajectory moves up a steep 
terrain, a greater amount of fault energy is absorbed as 
potential energy. As the trajectory climbs the steep walls of 
the valley, it converts fault kinetic energy into potential 
energy. When all of the kinetic energy is converted into 
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Figure 2-2. Potential energy function for a 3-machine system 
(from reference 35) 
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potential energy the trajectory will stop its ascent and will 
not climb higher. Thus, the faulted trajectory is analogous 
to a particle climbing up the hills around this valley. The 
disturbance imparts kinetic energy into the particle; the 
particle moves up the hill converting kinetic energy into 
potential energy. The trajectory is stable if the particle 
eventually settles at the SEP. An unstable trajectory, on the 
other hand, is one in which the particle manages to breach the 
summit and escape from the valley. The escape energy is the 
energy of the summit £t the point of escape. It is evident 
that the escape energy is dependent upon the point where the 
particular trajectory breaches the summit. 
All possible escape points are indicated on Figure 2-2 by 
the dotted line. These energy values represent the maximum 
energy of a trajectory escaping the valley and are 
points-of-no-return on any escape trajectory. Thus, the 
dotted line represents a locus of all of the possible escape 
energies. 
The Unstable Equilibrium points 
We note that there are two local minimum escape points, 
marked "A" and "B" on Figure 2-2. These are unstable 
equilibrium points (and are the focus of the direct methods), 
point "A" represents a local minimum escape energy of about 
3.5 units of energy, while point "B" represents a local 
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minimum escape energy of about 7 units of energy. The maximum 
amount of fault energy that the system can absorb (as 
potential energy) in a worst-case trajectory would correspond 
to Point "A". If escape in the direction of Point "A" is not 
a physical possibility then Point "B" may be the worst-case 
point of escape. The smallest amount of fault energy that 
could drive the system unstable is that of the lowest energy 
UEP that is physically realizable. 
The points "A" and "B" are UEPs and, as seen in Figure 
2-2, represent local minimum escape points on the ridge of the 
energy terrain. It should be noted that the UEPs represent 
minimum/maximum points (e.g., are saddle points): these UEPs 
are a maximum in that they represent points on the ridge, and 
a minimum in that they are minimum points on the ridge. 
A critical fault trajectory is seen as a trajectory that 
climbs the energy terrain, converting all of its kinetic 
energy into potential energy at the instant the particle 
arrives at the summit. This trajectory arrives at the escape 
point with zero velocity; it is undetermined as to whether or 
not the trajectory will become unstable. Theoretically, there 
is an infinite number of critical trajectories, but it is 
clear that the lowest energy critical trajectories will be 
ones that pass through the UEP. The UEPs are recognized as 
local minimum-energy escape points available to trajectories. 
The energy associated with the relevant UEP identifies the 
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critical energy for a given trajectory. 
n-Dimensional Energy Terrains 
The energy terrain of the multi-machine power system is-
visualized in a fashion similar to the three-machine system of 
Figure 2-2. A disturbance injects energy into the system and 
sets the generators into motion; the trajectory is visualized 
as a particle moving through n-dimensional space, converting 
kinetic energy into potential energy. The energy terrain, as 
reflected by potential energy contours, account for the amount 
of potential energy per unit of rotor displacement in the 
n-space. The amount of rotor motion (and corresponding 
potential energy absorbed) necessary to achieve instability 
will vary from one trajectory to another. If the system 
trajectory moves through a segment of high potential energy, 
then the network's ability to convert kinetic energy into 
potential energy is high, and a severe disturbance (as 
reflected in the amount of transient energy injected in the 
system clearing the fault) can be withstood. On the other 
hand, if a fault trajectory moves in a region where the 
potential energy surfaces are shallow, the network's ability 
to absorb transient energy is reduced, and instability occurs 
with a smaller disturbance. 
The locus of all possible escape points forms a 
hypersurface in the n-dimensional space. The UEPs are local 
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minimum-energy escape points on this hypersurface. A UEP that 
is the local minimum for a given trajectory is considered the 
relevant or controlling UEP for that trajectory; that is, the 
UEP closest to the trajectory of the disturbed system is 
thought to decide the stability of the transient response. 
The critical energy (i.e., the maximum amount of energy a 
disturbance can safely inject) is the energy which corresponds 
to this relevant or controlling UEP. 
If the n-machine system is faulted and the fault is 
cleared before the critical clearing time t^, the system 
trajectory peaks before reaching the limiting hypersurface. 
For a clearing time exceeding t^, the hypersurface is crossed 
(usually at a point other than the UEP) and instability 
results. A truly critical trajectory is one that reaches the 
hypersurface £t a UEP with zero velocity. 
The Energy Function 
Power System Representation 
The mathematical model used to describe the power system 
transient behavior is the classical model (see Chapter 2 of 
reference 43). This model is based on the following 
assumptions : 
1. Mechanical power into each generator is constant 
2. Damping is negligible 
3. Constant-voltage-behind-transient-reactance 
generator representation 
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4. Mechanical rotor angles correspond to the angle of 
the internal generator voltage 
5. Loads are represented by passive impedances 
The classical model is useful for the study of the transient 
response during the "first swing" of a disturbance, when the 
motion of the machine rotors are determined primarily by the 
electrical synchronizing forces and the inertial forces. 
For the classical model, the equations of motion for 
machine i are: 
MiOi = Pi - Pgi 
* i  =  -  1  i  =  1 , 2 , . . .  
( 2 -
where 
n 
Pgi = L  E.Ej [B^jSin(6.- ô y  +  G .  ^c o s  (  5 ^  6^ )  ]  
i^ j 
^i " ^mi " ^i^ii 
and, for unit i 
p . = mechanical power input 
mi 
G.i r real part of the driving point admittance for 
the internal generator node 
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B.j = transfer susceptance between nodes i and j 
E. = constant voltage behind transient reactance 
6^ = generator rotor angle 
= generator rotor speed 
= moment of inertia constant = 
u = rated synchronous speed 
The Center of inertia Formulation 
Equation 2-1 is written with respect to an arbitrary, 
synchronously rotating frame of reference. The equation must 
be re-formulated with respect to the center-of-inertia for all 
machines (34). 
For an n-generator system with rotor angles 6 and 
inertia constants , i = l, 2,... . . n (where = 2H./a,^), the 
position and speed of the inertial center are given by 
'  n / \ ) j :  « i S i  
1=1 
n 
CO = (1/M ) E M 5. 
^ i=l ^ ^ 
(2-2) 
where 
Mt = E Mi 
1=1 
The motion of the center-of-inertia is given by 
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- Pcoi 
1 — 1 
and 
*0 = "o 
(2-3) 
The generators' angles and speeds with respect to the 
center-of-inertia are defined by 
®i ' - ®o 
"i = «1 -"o 
(2-4) 
The equations for the motion of the individual machines, with 
respect to the center-of-inertia, become (34) 
= Pi - Pel -
®i ~ i 
(2-5) 
The Energy Function 
The expression for the system transient energy is 
formulated from equation 2-5. First, the swing equation is 
multiplied by and the sum is formed: 
E [MiWi - Pi + ^ ei " ©i 
1=1 
Recognizing that 
31 
n n £ Z E.E.B.j(sine.^)0. 
i=l j=l 
irj 
and 
n n ^ n-1 n 
23 Z E • E . G . • ( COS0. . ) 0. = ^  ^  c,. E .G . - (COS0. . ) (9-+9-) 
i=l j=l J ^ i=l j=i+l^ J.i] ] 
i/i 
we integrate 2-5 with respect to time; chosing the limits 
arbitrarily as "a" and "b". The expression for the system 
transient energy v becomes the function: 
.b 
V a = (1/2) - (w!)2] 
9 i=i 
-P-(0^ - 9?)] 
n-1 n 
S 2 E^E.[B^.(cos9^. 
i=l j=i+i 
-/ 
^ - COS0^j) 
(©5+0j) 
(®i+9j) 
cos0^j d(9^ + 9j)] 
-y (2-5) 
This function defines the system energy between any two 
points in the state space. We use the notation 
9 
0 
as a shorthand for the energy function. The superscripted 
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terms and 8^ imply both the angles and velocities of 
the points a and b in the state space (44,45). In the usual 
3 S 2 
application, G is the SEP, where the angles are 0 and 
the velocities are zero. 
The components of the energy function are readily 
identifiable in familiar terms. The first term is the kinetic 
energy, the second term is the position energy which 5s part 
of the system potential energy. The third term is the 
magnetic energy, which is also part of the system potential 
energy. The fourth term is the dissipation energy, which is 
the energy dissipated in the network transfer conductance 
(which represents both transmission network conductance and 
system loads) and is also considered part of the system 
potential energy. Following the terminology common in the 
literature, the term potential energy will be used to include 
the last three energy components. Furthermore, this 
dissertation refers to the potential energy being "absorbed" 
by the system even though a portion is dissipative. 
Approximating the Dissipative Term 
It is noted that the last term of equation 2-6 (the 
dissipative term) can be evaluated only if the system 
trajectory is known, various methods of approximating this 
term, without prior knowledge of the trajectory, have been 
suggested in the literature (33,34,40,41,42,46). The method 
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used in this investigation is suggested by Athay et al. 
(34/35). Their expression for the energy function is 
.b 0 
ie 
n 
& 
a = Z [(1/2)M. (w^)^ - (l/2)M.(u)^)^ 
- ) ] 
's j(COS0.j - COS9.j) + 
i=l j=i+l 
where 
(2-7) 
'ii 
e 
= an approximated term to account for 
transfer conductances. 
1 ] 1] 
(0.+9-)-(0. +0^) 
1(sin©^ . - sin0?.) 1] 1] 
Transient Fault Energy 
In examining equation 2-1, we see that if the SEP angle 
0^ is taken as the lower limit of integration 0^ (e.g., 
is the zero energy datum), the transient energy at any instant 
is 
V = V 
The expression evaluates the transient energy in the system at 
point 0^ in the state space. When represents the 
34 
post-fault SEP and 9^ represents the speeds and angles 
immediately after clearing, the energy function calculates the 
energy injected into the system by the disturbance, i.e., the 
fault transient energy, . 
.cl 
Vcl 
e 
0^2 
Critical Energy 
According to the energy function method, the critical 
energy is that energy associated with the appropriate UEP 
(©") for the particular disturbance under consideration. A 
critical trajectory is assumed to start at the SEP and reach 
the appropriate UEP with zero velocities. For such a 
trajectory, the critical energy is the energy at the* 
appropriate UEP (g") calculated with respect to the 
post-fault SEP (0^^): 
Vcr = V 
19" 
8=2 
Since the kinetic energy at both and 0=^ is 
assumed zero, the critical energy is potential energy only. 
Stability Analysis via Direct Methods 
The approach used by direct methods of transient 
stability assessment (34) is to compare the transient fault 
energy V^-, with the critical For the system to be stable, 
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the fault energy must be successfully absorbed as potential 
energy during the trajectory. This is taken to mean that all 
kinetic energy is converted to potential energy, and thus 
stability is predicted when which requires: 
u gcl 8 
3 S 2 > V  
9" 
V 
Analogy with the Equal-Area Criterion 
The energy function can easily be illustrated on the 
one-machine-infinite-bus system with zero transfer 
conductances (47). This is useful in that it illustrates the 
various features of the energy function and provides physical 
insight as to what the energy function actually represents. 
The power angle curves for the one-machine-infinite-bus 
system, neglecting transfer conductance, are shown in Figure 
2-3. The angles indicated as 0^^, 0*^^ and 0^ are 
respectively: pre-fault SEP, post-fault SEP, clearing angle, 
and UEP. 
Consider the situation at clearing. The energy function, 
using the post-fault network, evaluates the energy between the 
s 2 cl post-fault SEP (0 ) and clearing (0 ) by: 
>^cl 
Vol = V 8=2 
l / 2 ( u C - ) 2  -  E ^ E ^ B ^ ^ ( c o s  0 ^ ^  -  c o s  0 ^ 2 )  
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The first term of equation 2-8 is the transient kinetic energy 
and, according to the well-known equal-area criterion, 
represents area oabf in Figure 2-3. The second and third 
terms represent the potential energy of area cdf, and is 
familiar as the potential energy gained during the 
d isturbance. 
It should be noted, incidentally, that fault transient 
energy often computed with respect to the pre-fault SEP 
si si 0 . This calculation uses 0 as the reference and the 
energy at clearing would include the area oed, which 
si s 2 
represents the energy between 0 and 0 : 
Area oed= V 
0=2 
0=: 
The velocity at either stable point is assumed to be 
zero. The total system potential energy absorbing capacity, 
is represented by the area cdfg and is the energy between 
the SEP 0^2 and the UEP 0^. 
,oU 
V = Area cdfg = V 
cr 0=2 
In evaluating the critical energy, the velocity at both the 
SEP (0=2) and the UEP (0^) is assumed zero, so that 
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Point o; pre-fault operating point; 9 = 0^^, t = t~ 
Point a : electrical power at t = t^, 0 = 
Point b: electrical power at t = t~^, 0 = ©^' 
Point c; electrical power at t = t^, 9 = 0^' 
Point d: post-fault operating point, i.e., operating 
point then transient subsides, t ~ , 0 = 0^ 
Figure 2-3. Power angle curves for one-machine-infinite-bus 
system (transfer conductances neglected) 
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c 1 is purely potential energy. If 0 is the critical clearing 
angle, then 
s 9 (provided that is computed with respect to 0 ). This 
equality corresponds to the equal area criterion where 
area oabf + area cdf = area dgcd 
or 
area oabf = area cfg 
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CHAPTER 3. THE TEST POWER NETWORKS USED FOR VALIDATION 
The Two Test Systems 
This research used the energy function to analyze several 
faults on two test systems; the result is a detailed 
accounting of the system energy involved in a disturbance. 
The two power systems are a 4-generator system and a 
17-generator equivalent of the power system serving the State 
of lowa^. 
The 4-Generator Test System 
The 4-generator test system, shown in Figure 3-1, is a 
modified version of the 9-bus, 3-machine, 3-load system widely 
cited in the literature and referred to as the WSCC system 
(43). Two changes were made to the WSCC system: 
o Changing the rating of the transmission system from 
230 kv to 161 kv to avoid an excess VAR problem. 
(The R and X values in per unit remain unchanged.) 
o Adding a fourth generator, connected by a step-up 
transformer and a double-circuit 120-mile, 161-kv 
line. (The new generator has the same rating as 
one of the original generators, giving a new system 
generating capacity of 680 MW.) 
The generator data and initial operating conditions, 
1 While the networks were used in this research, their 
development and testing was not part of the work done for this 
dissertation. The networks were developed by Dr. K. Kruempel, 
Iowa State University. 
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Figure 3-1. The 4-generator test network 
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including the internal generator voltages, are given in Table 
3-1. The 4-generator system was primarily used for initial 
validation of new procedures and computer programs developed 
in the project. For faults near generator No. 4,' the mode of 
instability is simple and the system's transient behavior is 
rather predictable. 
17-Generator, Reduced Iowa System 
The power System Computer Service of Iowa State 
University has been involved in several full-scale stability 
studies for new generating units in the Iowa area. The 
Philadelphia Electric Transient Stability program^was used in 
these studies. The base data and the results of one of these 
studies, the NEAL 4 stability study, were used to develop a 
Reduced Iowa System model. Figure 3-2 shows the main study 
region and Figure 3-3 shows a partial one-line diagram of the 
area. The base load-flow system is modeled with 862 busses 
and 1323 lines and transformers. Most of the transmission 
lines are 345 kv and 151 kV; some of the lines are 230 kv, 115 
kv, or 69 kv. The base load-flow model was reduced by a 
load-flow network reduction program to a network with 163 
busses and 304 lines and transformers. Of the 163 busses, 30 
are terminal busses of the equivalent networks; of the 304 
lines and transformers, 69 are equivalent lines. The 
resulting system is referred to as the Reduced Iowa System. 
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Table 3-1. Generator data and initial conditions 
Generator* 
Parameters initial Conditions 
No. 
H 
MWs 
KiVA 
pâ 
Internal 
E pu 
Voltage 
deg. 
e": 
deg. 
4-generator system 
1 23.64 0.0608 2.269 1.0967 6.95 -4.08 
2 6.40 0.1198 1.600 1.1019 13.49 2.45 
3 3.01 0.1813 1.000 1.1125 8.21 -2.76 
4 6.40 0.1198 1.600 1.0741 24.90 13.91 
17-generator • system 
1 100.00 0.0040 20.000 1.0032 -27.92 -6.26 
2 34.56 0.0437 7.940 1.1333 -1.37 20.28 
3 80.-GVJ 0.0100 15.000 1.0 301 -16.28 5.35 
4 80.00 0.0050 15.000 1.0008 -26.09 -4.42 
5 16.79 0.0507 4.470 1.0678 -6.24 15.41 
6 32.49 0.0206 10.550 1.1235" -26.95 -5.29 
7 6.65 0.1131 1.309 1.0163 -23.02 -1.35 
8 2,66 0.3115 0.820 1.1235 -26.95 -5.29 
9 29.60 0.0535 5.517 1.1195 -12.41 9.25 
1 0 5.00 0.1770 1.310 1.0652 -11.12 10.53 
11 11.31 0.1049 1.730 1.0777 -24.30 -2.64 
12 19.79 0.0297 6.200 1.0609 -10.10 11.55 
13 200.00 0.0020 25.709 1.0103 -28.10 -6.44 
14 200.00 0.0020 23.875 1.0206 -26.76 -5.10 
15 100.00 0.0040 24.670 1.0182 -21.09 0.56 
16 28.66 0.0559 4.550 1.1243 —6 .70 14.95 
17 20.66 0.0544 5.750 1.1160 -4.35 17.30 
* 
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The Reduced Iowa System was selected to reproduce the 
"first swing" characteristics of the original 862 bus model. 
This was done using 17 generators. Seven of these generators 
correspond directly to generators in the original system, four 
generators are single generator equivalents of 2-machine pairs 
at the same generating plants, and six generators are 
equivalent machines that represent the inertia of machines 
eliminated by the load-flow network reduction. The value of 
inertia constants of these six machines was reduced from very 
large values to values of 100 or 200 s (on a 100-MVA base). 
The resulting 17-generator Reduced Iowa System is shown in 
Figure 3-4. 
Testing the Model 
Testing the Transient Response 
The transient response of the Reduced Iowa System was 
compared to the response data of the original NEAL 4 stability 
study. The NEAL 4 study included 43 generators modeled by the 
one axis model (including exciters and governors) and 80 
generators modeled classically. 
The first swing characteristics of the Reduced Iowa 
System compare rather well with the first swing 
characteristics from the NEAL 4 study. Rotor swings and power 
surges on the local area generators and key 345 kv 
transmission lines are similar. Examples of power surges on a 
Figure 3-4. l7-ç)enerator system (Reduced Iowa System) 
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345 kv line and a faulted generator are shown in Figure ?-5a 
and 3-5b, respectively. (This particular disturbance is a 
three-phase fault on the 345 kv bus at Neal, cleared by 
removing the Raun-Lakefield 345 kv line.) 
The generator data and initial operating conditions, 
including the internal generator voltages, are given in Table 
3-1. Line and transformer data and load-flow data for the 
operating condition analyzed in this project are given in 
reference (42). 
The Missouri River Transmission Corridor 
The Reduced Iowa System was used to simulate faults 
primarily in the western part of the network along the 
Missouri River. Of particular interest is a major 345 kv 
transmission corridor, shown in Figure 3-6. This transmission 
corridor, referred to in this dissertation as the Missouri 
River transmission corridor, connects Raun, Ft. Calhoun, SUB 
3456, Nebraska City, Cooper, and Council Bluffs. In all, 
seven generators are astride the Missouri River transmission 
corridor; Numbers 2, 5, 6, 10, 12, 16, and 17 in Figure 3-4. 
This transmission corridor represents a relatively strong 
connection between these seven generators; a disturbance along 
the corridor significantly disturbs all seven generators. A 
wide variety of very complex modes of instability occur, 
offering a severe test for any transient stability analysis 
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procedure. The Reduced Iowa System is both a severe test 
environment and a practical, real-world system. It represents 
the 1980 power system for the State of Iowa, operating at an 
80% load level. 
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CHAPTER 4. INVESTIGATION OF THE ENERGY FUNCTION BY SIMULATION 
STUDIES 
Introduction 
In the course of the investigation conducted in this 
research, some of the basic questions concerning the energy 
function method had to be dealt with. Among these are: the 
validity of the concept of the relevant UEP; analysis of the 
components of the system transient energy, and developing an 
understanding of the mechanism by which some generators 
separate from the rest of the system. This was accomplished 
by detailed simulation studies. 
This research carefully investigated disturbances applied 
to the two test networks described in the previous chapter. 
In the 4-generator system, a three-phase fault was applied at 
bus 10 and was cleared by opening one of the lines between bus 
10 and bus 12. In the 17-generator system, faults on the 
Missouri River transmission corridor were investigated, e.g., 
a three-phase fault applied at Raun (bus 372) and cleared by 
opening the Raun-Lakefield 345 kv line (bus 372 to bus 193). 
In both cases, the energy function was used to evaluate 
the energy at each step in the simulation. This provided a 
means of inspecting the energy of the system during a 
disturbance. 
The relevant UEPs were carefully determined, and the 
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trajectories of the disturbed 
determine the influence of the 
addition, the predicted value 
computed. 
system were examined to 
relevant UEPs (if any). In 
of the critical energy was 
Computing the Unstable Equilibrium Points 
The unstable equilibrium point (UEP) is the solution to 
the equations; 
M.fL. = 0 = P. - Pg^ - i = l,2,...,n 
(4-1) 
The solution to these equations is similar to the solution of 
the load-flow problem, except that the mismatch power (P^^^) 
is distributed amongst the generators in proportion to the 
inertias, rather than being attributed to a swing machine. 
Mathematically there are an infinite number of solutions to 
equation 4-1. We are interested only in those solutions 
within the space 
9 < 2% 
In that space there are (2*^ - 1) such solutions that represent 
unstable equilibrium points (of which we are only interested 
in a few). 
The UEPS are computed in this research using a 
Davidon-Fletcher-Powell (DFP) minimization routine provided by 
Systems Control Inc. (34) (also see the Appendix for a brief 
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description of the DFP technique). Rewriting equation 4-1 as: 
£i = Pi -
or 
fi = 0 
a power mismatch function is defined as 
" 2 
F(9) = E(fi) 
i=l 
This power mismatch equation is the objective function whose 
minimization, via the DFP technique, yields the UEP. The 
equilibrium points are those sets of generator angles for 
which the power mismatch is everywhere zero; consequently, 
F{0) is minimum. 
It is noted that the DFP routine does not assure 
convergence to 5 physically meaningful equilibrium point. To 
quote Athay et al. (35), "given an initial set of angles 
inside the principal singular surface an algorithm based on 
the minimization of F(0) will converge to the SEP; given 
initialization outside it will converge to the closest, in 
terms of F(0), UEP." The angles to which this routine will 
converge may include physically absurd values (i.e., some 
angles may be in the order of several thousand degrees). In 
order to accomplish convergence to a physically meaningful 
57 
UEP, the initial angles must be close to the actual UEP 
values. The UEPs used in this research are obtained by 
starting the DFP procedure at the point where the highly 
disturbed machines (as seen by speeds and angles of clearing) 
are at advanced angles (typically 3.0 radians) and the 
remaining machines are at their SEP angles. 
UEP values 
The UEPs obtained for the faults on the 4-generator and 
17-generator systems agreed with the mode of instability 
actually realized. Table 4-1 shows the predicted UEps and 
their potential energy. 
Examination of the data in Table 4-1 shows which machines 
are those tending to separate from the system. In the 
4-generator system, 0^ is well-advanced; this is the 
generator that goes unstable (for a fault on bus 10). in the 
17-generator system, generators 5 and 6 are well-advanced and 
these two generators actually go unstable. Additionally, 
machines 2, 10, 12, 16 and 17 are somewhat advanced; these are 
the remaining machines on the Missouri River transmission 
corridor. These data are reasonable since the fault is quite 
close to generator No. 4 in the 4-generator system and to 
generators 5 and 6 in the 17-generator system, and is astride 
the Missouri River transmission corridor. 
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Table 4-1. Predicted UEP angles 
a) 4-generator system, fault at bus 10, line 8-10 cleared 
= -27.7° ©2 = -11.3° 
©2 = -5.5° ©^ = 113.2° 
Vjj = 0.6260 pu (with respect to 
s2 
= 0.5703 pu (with respect to © ) 
b) 17-generator system, fault at bus 372, line 372-192 
cleared 
©" = -1.4° e" = -16.0° ©"3 = -25.8° 
©2 = 46.6° ©g = -8.0° ©"^ = -23.6° 
©3 = 9.7° ©g = -6.6° ©"g = -17.6° 
©'2 = -24.0° ©TO = 47.8° ©" = 63.6° 
4 10 16 
©g = 163.6° ©"^ = 10.3° ©"^ = 50.1° 
©" = 144.9° ©" = 49.6° 
o 12 
s 1 
= 16.66 pu (with respect to © ) 
S2 
= 17.18 pu (with respect to 0 ) 
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System Trajectories and System Energy 
The computer program used to simulate the three-phase 
disturbances provided rotor positions and speeds at each time 
increment At. Additionally, at each time increment the 
system energy was computed. Each energy component (kinetic, 
position, magnetic, and conductance) was displayed in order to 
give a mapping of where the system energy resides during the 
trajectory. It should be noted, incidentally, that the energy 
is calculated using the initial machine positions as 
reference; the energy is thus calculated with respect to the 
s 1 pre-fault stable equilibrium 0 
4-Generator System 
Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show some of the results obtained for 
the 4-generator system; the first shows the case of the fault 
cleared at 0.148 s (stable) and the latter shows the fault 
cleared at 0.159 s (unstable). The two cases, therefore, 
bracket the critical clearing instant t . The rotor 
^ c 
trajectories for all four generators are shown; additionally, 
the system kinetic energy and potential energy are shown. It 
is evident, from inspection of Figure 4-1, that the maximum 
potential energy corresponds in time with the minimum kinetic 
energy, and that this correspondence in turn approximately 
corresponds to the peak of the trajectory of machine 4. This 
appears to confirm the notion that kinetic energy is being 
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Figure 4-2. 4-generator .system, fault at Bus 10 cleared at 0.159s 
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converted to potential energy, and that, at the peak of the 
swing of generator 4, nearly all the kinetic energy has 
successfully been absorbed by the system. The maximum 
potential energy is 0.57 pu. The kinetic energy minimum is 
near, (but not equal to), zero. 
In Figure 4-2, the point of inflection of generator 4 
(beyond which machine 4 accelerates into instability) is seen 
to occur somewhat near the maximum potential energy, minimum 
kinetic energy point. This occurs when 
9^ = 112° and 0^ = -28°, 
which are almost identical to the values predicted by the USP 
of 
0^ = 113.2° and 0^ = -27.7° 
We note, however, that the values of 0^ and 0^ at 
that instant are 
0^ = 1.9° and 0^ = -6.1°. 
These differ from the predicted value of 
©2 = -5.5° and 0^ = 11.3° 
by a few degrees (see Table 4-1). The maximum potential 
energy is about 0.63 pu; we conclude that the critical energy 
is between 0.57 pu and 0.63 pu: 
0.57 < < 0.63 
The data suggest that the critical trajectory of the 
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critical machine seems to reach the position predicted by the 
UEP, while other machines may be off a little from their UEP 
values. It is not immediately clear from this case whether 
the critical energy (evidently between .57 pu and .63 pu) is 
specified by the maximum potential energy, minimum kinetic 
energy point or by the peak of the swing of 0^. 
Nonetheless, the critical energy compares well with the energy 
predicted by the UEP of 0.57 pu (with respect to 9^^. See 
Table 4-1). 
17-Generator System 
The fault on the 17-generator system is located on the 
high voltage side of the transformer at generator No. 6 (bus 
372) . The location is also electrically close to generator , 
No. 5. Although the fault is quite close to both of these 
machines, their responses differ significantly, peaking at 
substantially different instants. This is attributed to the 
fact that the inertias and synchronizing forces of the two 
machines differ substantially. Though the fault significantly 
disturbs the entire Missouri River corridor (Generators 
2.-5.-6,-10.-12,-16,- and 17), a critical trajectory ultimately 
sends only machines 5 and 6 unstable. 
To investigate the instability of the 5,6 group, a series 
of stability runs was made near the critical clearing time: 
at tg = 0.189 s, 0.192 s and 0.1932 s. plots of ©^, Gg, and 
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the system kinetic energy, potential energy, and total energy 
are shown In figures 4-3 through 4-5. Additionally, since the 
gross motion of the 5,5 group is of particular interest, the 
motion of the inertial center of this 2-generator group is 
also indicated as ^. upon examining these data, we note 
D f O 
the following: 
o The swings of generators 5 and 6 peak about 0.3 s 
apart. The motion of the inertial center of the 
5,6 group peaks between the peaks of the swing of 
generator 5 and generator 6. 
o For the disturbance cleared at t^ = 0.189 s, the 
peak potential energy and minimum kinetic energy 
coincide with the peak of the inertial center 
®5,6* 
o For clearing just under the critical clearing value 
(i.e., t = 0.192 s), the peak of 9 coincides 
c b f b 
with the system potential energy, which is nearly 
equal to that of the UEP. (P.E. = 16.2, = 16.6, 
see Table 4-1). At that instant, 
8, = 156° e. = 141° ©c c = 145° 
5 6 5,6 
These are very close to the angles predicted by the 
UEP: 
05 = 164° 9g = 145° = 150° 
Note that actual motion of the 5,6 group falls 5 
degrees short of the value predicted by the UEP in 
this stable trajectory. 
o The system trajectory continues toward maximum 
potential energy, minimum kinetic energy at a later 
instant. 
o The point of inflection is the point on an unstable 
trajectory that corresponds to the peak of the 
swing of a stable trajectory. This point of 
inflection for the unstable case (t^ = 0.1932 s) 
shows 
e- = 156° 9. = 156° 9_ c = 156° 
3 6 3,6 
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Note that the inertial center is only 6 degrees 
beyond the inertial center specified by the UEP. 
It appears that the gross motion of the critical 
group approached the UEP for the critical 
trajectory. 
From the computer runs (not shown in the figures), 
we note that at the instant of the peak of G, r 
D f D 
the angles of the four highest-inertia machines 
(which are equivalent machines remote from the 
disturbance) are given by; 
= 6.6° 0^2 = -31.5° = -30.4° 
*15 = 
while the UEP predicts: 
e" = -1.4° G^3 = -25.8° = -23.6° 
8^^ = -17.6° 
Therefore, the system trajectory seems to be 
passing near, but not exactly through, the 
controlling UEP. While the generators tending to 
separate from the rest of the system pass at or 
very near their UEP values, the rotors of the other 
generators are at positions off by a few degrees 
from their corresponding UEP values. 
The degree of group separation indicated by the UEP 
(i.e., S ^  ) is more or less the degree of 0 / b 
separation required for instability to accur. 
Still, it is not clear whether the UEP is 
"approached" in terms of the individual (critical) 
machines or in the sense of the gross motion of the 
machines. 
The kinetic energy minimum is not zero for either 
the stable or unstable case. This is a significant 
point that will be discussed later in this chapter. 
For t^ greater than critical (t^ = 0.1932 s), the 
system crossed the maximum, potential energy "ridge" 
at a point different than the UEP. For this 
trajectory, the system peak potential energy is 
close to that of the UEP. However, the maximum 
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potential energy, minimum kinetic energy instant is 
not established as a point of significance in 
establishing Stability seems to be decided, 
instead, between the peak of the swing of the 5,6 
group (for the stable case) and the point of 
inflection of the 5,6 group (in the unstable case). 
In both cases, the maximum potential energy, 
minimum kinetic energy point does not occur until a 
later instant. 
The data presented in Figures 4-3 through 4-5 show that the 
concept of a particular UEP controlling the fault trajectory 
is a valid one. The "critical machines" appear to be the 
highly-advanced machines; these approach very near to the UEP 
values on the critical trajectory and give a system potential 
energy that is very close Lo that of the UEP. There are two 
additional points of significance to be noted: the system 
minimum kinetic energy is not zero, and the generators other 
than the critical ones may be off by a few degrees from their 
UEP values. 
Energy Analysis 
A more detailed analysis of the transient energy of the 
17-generator system is carried out by plotting the various 
components of energy along the system trajectory. The same 
fault (at Raun, cleared by opening the Raun-Lakefield line) is 
investigated. In one case, the fault is cleared at 0.15 s to 
represent a very stable disturbance. In the other two cases, 
clearing is carefully chosen to bracket the critical clearing 
instant as closely as the computer programs will allow: t^ = 
70 
0.1923 s and = 0.1926 s. 
Clearing at 0.15s 
In this trajectory the system is significantly 
disturbed, but system stability is not endangered. 
The data for this disturbance are displayed in 
Figure 4-6(a) and 4-5(b). The first figure show? 
selected rotor trajectories (generators 2,5,6,10,13 
and 16) and the inertial center of 5 and 6 (8, g)• 
D / O 
All of these machines, except generator 13, 
represent generators on the Missouri River 
transmission corridor; generator 13 is a machine 
with a very high inertia constant (200 s) located 
outside the study area. The fault splits the system 
into two groups; the seven generators of the 
Missouri River transmission corridor swing with 
V" a c v-\ a 4- t- X A TTinnKO 
4-6 (b) shows the system transient energy for this 
case, displayed as four components (position, 
magnetic, conductance, and kinetic energy) as well 
as potential energy and total energy. The plot of 
total energy clearly shows that the transient 
energy increases up to the point of clearing. 
After clearing, no additional energy is injected 
into the system and the total energy remains 
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constant. It is particularly interesting to note 
the interaction between potential energy and 
kinetic energy. System energy is exchanged back 
and forth between the two energy forms, with the 
maximum potential energy corresponding in time to 
the minimum kinetic energy (and vice versa) . The 
first maximum potential energy, minimum kinetic 
energy point corresponds to the peak of the swing 
of 9c g, i.e., where the critical group acquires 
b r O 
zero velocity. 
ult Cleared at 0.1923 s and 0.1926s 
These two cases bracket the critical clearing 
instant as closely as possible. The stable case, 
with t^ = 0.1923 s, is shown in Figure 4-7(a) 
(selected rotor trajectories) and Figure 4-7(b) 
(energy). Data for the unstable case, with t^ = 
0.1926 s, are similarly displayed in Figures 4-8(a) 
and (b). The stable case is very close to the case 
with t^ = 0.1920 s, presented in Figure 4-4. We 
note that the trajectories pass very near the UEP 
at about 0.70 s. The rotor angles at this instant 
are : 
Gc = 166° 0. = 144° Gr c = 149.8° 
D D 3,0 
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These compare to the UEP angles of 
= 164° 0g = 145° = 150° 
This point corresponds to the instant where 8, _ 2 f D 
reaches its peak (or zero velocity instant). In 
the unstable case, the point of inflection occurs 
at an only slightly later time and at an angle of 
9 _ _ = 151 » 3 • 5,6 
For the stable case, simple interpolation 
identifies the point 9- g = which occurs at b, 0 
0.7 0 s when 
PE = 16.73 pu 
For the unstable trajectory, the point is indicated 
by the point of inflection (i.e., 9, ^  = 0) which 3, b 
occurs at 0.7353 s where 
PE = 16.97 pu. 
We conclude from these data that the maximum 
transient energy that the system can absorb (i.e., 
the critical energy must lie between these two 
values : 
16.73 < < 16.97 
This compares to the value predicted by the UEP of 
= 16.66 pu (see Table 4-1) 
This also suggests that the point on "the critical 
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trajectory, corresponding to this energy, satisfies 
the criterion: 
®5,6 = G 
®5,6 ' ®
As with the previous cases, the positions of the 
generators other than the critical machines are off 
by a few degrees from their UEP values. 
Figures 4-7(b) and 4-8 (b) reveal a very 
important aspect of the energy distribution along 
the system trajectory, it is sometimes reported in 
the literature that the critical energy, which is 
the network's maximum ability to absorb the 
transient energy, is the maximum potential energy 
along the trajectory. We have already seen that 
the critical energy is less than 17 units. 
Figure 4-7(b) shows, however, that the maximum 
potential energy is 18.75 pu and occurs at t = 0.96 
s. That this is not is evident from Figure 
4-8 (b), where the system becomes unstable when less 
than this amount of transient energy is injected 
into the system. Indeed, for that case, when the 
energy is 17.9 pu (at t = 0.9 s) g is already 
accelerating toward instability. 
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The point of maximum potential energy (and 
minimum kinetic energy) does not represent the 
associated with the instability of the 5,6 group. 
Though it is not shown in the figure, careful 
examination of the data shows that the instant of 
maximum potential energy and minimum kinetic energy 
is the peak of the swing of all seven machines on 
the Missouri River transmission corridor, i.e., the 
inertial center of generators 2,5,6,10,12,16, and 
17 (taken with respect to the remaining 10 
machines: 1,3,4,7,8,9,11,13,14,15)^ Since that 
7-machine group is not the critical group, the 
value of is not defined by the energy at the 
peak of the swing of that 7-machine group. 
Instead, it is the energy at the peak of the 5,6 
group (i.e., the critical group) that identifies 
» = r-
An additional observation concerning the 
kinetic energy is in order. The instant at which 
the critically stable trajectory comes close to the 
UEP and 9- , reaches its peak, the kinetic energy 
5,0 
of the system is not zero; rather, at that instant, 
K.E. = 2.17 pu. In the unstable trajectory, the 
instant at which g reaches its inflection point 
corresponds to K.E. = 1.967 pu. 
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Implications of the Data 
These data are of considerable significance to transient 
stability analysis by direct methods. It clearly indicates 
that; 
o The critical transient energy occurs when the 
critical machines in the system (i.e., the 
generators tending to separate from the rest) pass 
at (or very near to) their value at the UEP. This 
amount of critical transient energy appears to be 
the same as the value of v at the UEP. The 
extensive investigations, conducted in the course 
of this work, seem to indicate that for gll 
practical purposes the value of V (at 9 ) can be 
used with sufficient accuracy as 
o A certain amount of kinetic energy, between 1.967 
and 2.17 units, is not absorbed by the system at 
the UEP. This indicates that not all transient 
energy created by the fault contributes to the 
instability of the system. This component is 
associated with the intermachine motion, not with 
separating the critical machines from the others 
(e.g., at the instant where 8% g = 0, not every 
0 f D 
machine velocity will be zero; this is motion 
around the inertial centers and represents kinetic 
energy that does not contribute to the instability 
of the 5,6 group). 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The results presented in this chapter merit the following 
conclusions : 
1. The concept of a controlling UEP for a particular 
system trajectory is a valid concept, 
2. From the values of 9-, i = 1,2...n, the critical 
machines are those tending.to separate from the 
rest and having the largest values of 9^. 
3. At critical clearing, the system trajectory is such 
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that only the critical machines need pass at, or 
very near to, their values at the UEP. Other 
generator:; may be off from their UEP values. 
Î. If more than one generator tends to lose 
synchronism, instability is determined by the gross 
motion of tnese machines, i.e., by the motion of 
their center of inertia. 
5. The critical energy (e.g., the maximum 
potential energy that the system can absorb and 
stay stable) is the potential energy at the peak of 
the swing of the inertial center of the critical 
group during the critical trajectoy. 
6. The value of the energy at the UEP (V^) is, for all 
practical purposes, equal to the critical energy 
Vcr' 
7. Not all the fault kinetic energy (at t^) 
contributes directly to the separation of the 
critical machines from the rest of the system; some 
of that energy accounts for intermachine swings. 
For stability analysis, that component of kinetic 
energy does not contribute to instability and 
should be subtracted from the energy that needs to 
be absorbed by the system for stability to be 
maintained. 
8. First-swing transient stability can be accurately 
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assessed by the energy function if it is evaluated 
using the controlling UEP and the energy function 
is modified to include a correction for the kinetic 
energy not contributing to instability. The 
method, then, is: 
o determine the correct critical group and, 
thus, the controlling UEP; compute the 
critical energy 
o determine the transient energy at the end of 
the disturbance (V -) and correct it for the 
kinetic energy that does not contribute to 
instability. 
o compare to stability requires that 
cr 
< V 
cl 
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CHAPTER 5. THE TRANSIENT ENERGY MARGIN 
Defining the Transient Energy Margin 
Chapter 2 introduced the energy function. Athay et al. 
(34) defined the system transient energy to be given by this 
energy function, evaluated (using the post-fault Y-bus) 
S 2 between 0 and any angle Q on the disturbed trajectory: 
V = V 
,s2 
S 2 
using © as reference, the transient fault energy is 
defined as; 
Vol = " 
.cl 
e 
s2 
(5-1) 
The critical energy is assumed to be the energy of the UEP 
with zero velocities: 
Vcr = V 
0 
0 
(5-2) 
The system stability is determined by comparison between 
and (provided that they are both computed with the same 
S 2 
reference, 0 ). Stability is predicted if 
Vcr > Vci 
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or 
Ver - Ycl > 0 
This research considered the difference between and 
to be the transient energy margin aV: 
'  " o r  -  ^ cl 
Substituting equation 5-1 and 5-2 in equation 5-3: 
.cl 
(5-3) 
6V = V 
0 
e 
s2 
9 
.s2 
Thus, 
= V = Transient Energy Margin 
AV = £ [(1/2)M. _ p^(QU_QCi^ 
i=l 
n-1 n ,, c 1 
-E j (cose, - cose.. ) 
i=l j=i+l 
sU .cl, 
" 'ii e cl 
(5-4) 
(5-5) 
where the last term is the approximation to account for 
transfer conductances; 
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0 
'ii 8 cl ,oU.-eÇj) 
ine^. • ^cl Sin©.j) 
(5-6) 
Thus, by knowing the values of rotor angles and speeds at 
clearing and the position of the relevant UEP, the transient 
energy margin can be evaluated directly, using the 
post-disturbance network. In other words, there is no need to 
compute the value of the energy function at 9^, and its value 
at 0" (with each referred to the same 0^), and then to 
compute the difference. 
The transient energy margin defined directly as 
:V = V 
e" 
has several advantages over subtracting from 
o The need for computing the post-fault S^P is 
avoided altogether, eliminating the need for one 
load-flow solution for each line cleared. 
o The energy function is computed only once (for cV) 
rather than twice (for and 
si s 2 
o The question of reference (0  vs 0 ) never 
a rises. 
o Computation of the term i^. involves less 
approximation, since only àne approximation is used 
(for ÛV) rather than two (for and , and 
since the approximation is over a gçaller gegment 
of the trajectory (e.g., between 0 and 0 , 
rather than between 0^^ and ©"). 
o Assessment of system stability is accomplished by 
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examining the degree of stability. Thus, by 
focussing on the system's ability to absorb the 
faulty transient energy, a more important question 
is addressed: "What is the margin of safety?" 
Kinetic Energy Correction Applied to the Energy Margin 
As pointed out in Chapter 4, a correction must be made to 
compute the "true" system transient energy at clearing which 
actually contributes to instability. The kinetic energy, 
associated with intermachine motion about the inertial 
centers, which is not contributing to instability, must be 
corrected for. 
The kinetic energy which is responsible for the 
separation of the critical generators from the rest of the 
system is the kinetic "energy associated with the gross motion 
of the critical generators, i.e., that kinetic energy 
associated with the motion of the inertial center of the 
critical machines taken with respect to the inertial center of 
all other generators. The remaining portion of the kinetic 
energy need not be absorbed by the system for stability to be 
maintained; this kinetic energy is associated with the 
relative motion of each group of machines about their centers 
of inertia and does not represent a contribution to the gross 
motion of the group. 
The kinetic energy associated with the gross motion of k 
machines having angular speeds (with respect to their center 
of inertia) of 
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i — 1/ 2/ 3f ........k 
is the same as the kinetic energy of their inertial center. 
The speed of the inertial center, and its kinetic energy, is 
given by 
"coi = 
1=1 1=1 
(5-7) 
K.E. = (l/2)Mt(WgQi) 
(5-8) 
Essentially, we see a disturbance splitting the 
generators of the system into two groups: the critical 
machines and the rest of the generators. Each group has a 
kinetic energy associated with its gross motion, as indicated 
by the motion of each inertial center; the total kinetic 
energy is the sura of two expressions similar to equations 5-7 
and 5-8: 
K.E. = (l/ZlMcfUcr * 'l/2)Ksys-|ys 
This same result is obtained by a different approach, 
which is somewhat more physically meaningful. We can consider 
the gross motion of the two groups as equivalent to that of a 
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two-machine system. The kinetic energy causing separation of 
the two groups is the same as that of an equivalent 
one-raachine-infinite-bus system (see reference 47) having an 
inertial constant and angular speed w given by: 
eq eq 
and 
"eq " ("crX^sys'/'^r-^^ys' 
•"'•'eq (^cr ~ ^ sys^ 
(5-9) 
The kinetic energy is given by 
K.E. = 
(5-10) 
The kinetic energy correction is, thus 
n 
zKEcor: = U/2)EKJ^? - (l/2)M^ q(u^ g )  
(5-11) 
Notice that ^i-^E^orr always be positive. Again, the 
kinetic energy term in the margin should be corrected 
accordingly. We, therefore, define the corrected energy 
margin by 
A I®" 
(5-12) 
Since the kinetic ei.ergy correction is always positive, it 
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will always serve to increase the margin. 
The kinetic energy contributing to system separation is 
illustrated in the following examples. 
4-generator System 
For the three-phase fault at bus 10 cleared at 0.1 s by 
opening one of the lines between busses 10 and 12, the 
critical machine is generator number 4, which tends to 
separate from the system. Data for calculating the kinetic 
energy correction at clearing are shown in Table 5-1. From 
this table we note that the total kinetic energy equals 0.2703 
pu. Generator No. 4, which represents about 16% of the total 
SyStem inertia, is accelerated. The 3-generator group (1, 2, 
and 3), representing 84% of the system inertia, is 
decelerated. The kinetic energy associated with the gross 
motion of each group is to be calculated. Since the 
accelerating group consists of only one generator, the kinetic 
energy is found from Table 5-1 to be 0.2187 pu. This number 
needs no adjustment. The kinetic energy of the 3-machine 
decelerating group is the kinetic energy of the inertial 
center of that group. We obtain the following data: 
= 0.0340 = 0.00951 = 0.2187 pu 
Mg g = 0.1754 wsys = -0.00184 = 0.0424 pu 
SI 
Table 5-1. 4-generator system, fault at bus 10, cleared at 
0.1S 
c 
Gen. No. M- to pu K.E. 
1 0.1254 -0.004 0.0507 
2 0.034 -0.0005 0.0006 
3 0.016 -0.0005 0.0003 
4 0.034 0.0095 0.2187 
total = 0.2703 pu 
The kinetic energy of the accelerating group is .2187 pu; the 
kinetic energy of the decelerating group is .0424 pu; the 
total kinetic energy of the gross motion is the sum of these 
numbers, and is .2611 pu. 
This same number can be found by converting to an 
equivalent one-machine-infinite-bus system: 
Mgg = 0.02848 Wg = 0.01136 ^^total " 0*2611 pu 
Comparing this value to kinetic energy at clearing (.2703), 
the kinetic energy correction for this case is 
ZiKEcorr = 0.0082 pu 
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17-Generator System 
For a three-phase fault at bus 372 (near generator No.6) 
cleared at 0.15 s by opening line 372-193, the generators 
which ultimately separate from the system are generators No. 5 
and 6. These generators are taken as the critical group. The 
other five machines of the Missouri River transmission 
corridor (No. 2, 10, 12, 16, and 17) are accelerated with 
generators 5 and 6, while the rest of the machines are either 
decelerated or not significantly disturbed. Generators 5 and 
6, which represent only about 5% of the total inertia of the 
system, have a center of inertia velocity of .01874 pu. The 
rest of the system (95% of the inertia) has a group velocity 
of ,00095 pu. We obtain the following data; 
= 0.08907 OJ ^ = 0.01142 pu KE^ = 0.83 pu 
= 0.17235 = 0.02252 pu KE^ = 6.22 pu 
D D D 
KEc+KE, = 7.05 pu 5 b 
For the inertial center of the 5,6 group: 
Mr c = 0.26143 w = 0.01874 KE^ . = 6.53 pu b/b bfb b/b 
For all other machines: 
«other = 4-8744% "othe: = -Me9i4 = 0.32 pu 
93 
Total kinetic energy for the gross motion is: 
KEtotal = 6.53 + 0.32 = 6.839 pu. 
To calculate the same kinetic energy from the equivalent 
one-machine-infinite-bus system, we obtain: 
Mg = 0.24312 Wgq = 0.0197 KE^Qtal = 6.839 pu 
The total kinetic energy for this case is 7.97 pu. Thus, the 
energy correction at clearing is : 
AKEcorr = 1.131 pu 
which is a 14% adjustment in the kinetic energy. That is, at 
the instant of clearing, 14% of the kinetic energy is involved 
in intermachine motion around the inertial centers and that 
14% does not contribute to separation of the critical group 
from the rest of the system. 
Other Corrections; Applied to the Energy Margin 
While the major correction in the energy margin is the 
kinetic energy correction, other minor corrections may be in 
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order. This dissertation defines the transient energy margin 
as the energy function properly evaluated between clearing and 
the UEP. Other researchers, familiar with the transient 
energy function as offered by SCI, might define the margin as 
being the difference between and As stated 
previously, the transient energy margin defined as between 
c 1 u 0 and 0 is not exactly the same as the margin computed as 
the difference between and Two points must be 
considered to reconcile the two definitions. 
V and V -, r.iust be computed using a common 
^ ^ si s2 
reference (e.g., © vs 0 ). It is common to 
compute V with respect to the post-fault SEP, 
s ? ^ ^ 0 , and V -, with respect to the pre-fault SEP, 
si ^ 0 . In Chapter 3, we stated that in such cases 
the correction -
V 
0 si 
must be applied.must be subtracted from 
to refer it to 0 : 
I o S2 
0 s2 
V 
I a C l  
^Sl 
= V 
0 s2 
In the 17-generator system, for example, the correction 
is computed as: 
,s2 0 
0 
si = 0.142 pu 
The approximation terra, 
,u I o'-
cl 
0 
that accounts for the network transfer conductances 
in the energy function is defined as by equation 
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5-6. This approximation for the conductance term 
does not give the same value for the margin when 
computed as 
AV = 
as it does when computed directly as 
(5-13) 
AV = V 
9 cl (5-14) 
Being specific, this is because the margin computed 
via equation (5-14) will contain the terms 
1] .cl -
(e"+e")-(0?^+e^^) 
(  - M — — -  )  (sine" . - sine?^) 1] 1] « c 1 
- J -J (®ij"®ij) 
while the same margin calculated using equation (5-13), 
will contain the terms 
9 u 
8 S2 " ^ ij 
9 cl 
9 S2 
( e ^ + e ^ - ( e 2 2 + Q S 2 )  
sin€u . - sin9^?) 
(e^+e%}-(9?^+e!^) 
" _cl _s2, ) ( 
c 2. . S 2 
sin©. . — sin9. .) 1] 1] 
The two expressions, though intended to estimate the 
same conductance energy, clearly are not identical. 
The computation using equation (5-14) is taken to be 
more accurate. A correction equal to the difference 
between the two conductance approximations must be 
applied in order to reconcile the results obtained by 
the two computational techniques. For the 17-machine 
case, for example, this correction amounts to 
Icorr = -0-356 pu 
The correction (of = -.36 pu) must be added to 
the margin obtained by equation (5-13) to reconcile it 
with results obtained via equation (5-14). 
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Thus, for the 17-inachine system the - V^, definition 
may be expressed as 
= V 
U _Cl gS2 8 
9^2 
8 
.SI + V 
^corr 
where the last two terms will represent a total correction for 
the 17-generator system of: 
= -0.142 - 0.356 
corr 
-0.496 
Of course, use of the equation (5-14) avoids these 
corrections altogether, as they are embedded in the basic 
definition. However, to assure completeness in this 
dissertation, we used the energy terms, V^, and aV^; we 
use the term to denote the corrected energy in order to 
facilitate reconciliation. 
One other adjustment to the energy margin should be 
mentioned even though it cannot be quantified at this point. 
This adjustment, or correction, is applied to to account 
for the angular distance by which the critical trajectory 
misses the UEP. This energy can be thought of as consisting 
97 
of two parts: the energy associated with how far the 
non-critical generators miss their UEP positions, and the 
energy associated with how far the critical generators miss 
their UEP positions. In the former case, the energy seems 
consistently small (in the order of 0.5 pu) during the entire 
trajectory, while the latter is small when the critical 
generators approach the UEP on the critical trajectory. In 
chapter 4 we concluded that, for all practical purposes, the 
UEP energy can be taken as equal to the critical escape 
energy. 
procedure for Computing the Transient Energy Margin 
The transient energy margin for a given post-fault system 
is the transient energy function evaluated between 0*^ and 
c i 9 and corrected for kinetic energy not contributing to 
instability: 
AVG = V 
G 
cl "*• ^KE^orr 
The procedure for calculating the transient energy margin 
involves the following steps: 
1. Identifying the critical machines, i.e., the 
generators tending to separate from the rest of the 
system. 
2. Determining the specific post-disturbance network 
configuration to be considered. 
3. Identifying the relevant UEP (9^) for the 
disturbance under investigation. 
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4. Computing the angle and speeds of the generators at 
fault clearing, i.e., 6^^ and 
5. Computing ^ 
AV = V 0=^ 
6. Computing the kinetic energy at clearing which does 
not contribute to system separation and 
correcting AV to obtain AV^-
7. If the procedure is to be repeated for other 
post-disturbance network configurations (i.e., 
other lines cleared), computing the changes in the 
Y-bus and the corresponding 9^ and AV^. 
These steps are outlined in order to identify the 
computational aspects encountered during implementation. In 
practice, however, steps 5 and 6 are combined. 
The Computer Programs 
In this research, the computations of the transient 
energy margin are actually performed by two computer programs 
or packages of programs. 
package I. 
In this package, the following information is obtained: 
o The generators' positions, velocities, and 
accelerations during the fault period 
o The post-fault Y-bus 
This package is based on programs received from SCI. It has 
been modified to include the following additional features: 
o Plotting the rotor positions of individual 
generators 
o Computing and plotting the positions of the 
inertial centers of a group of generators 
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o Computing and plotting the energy components during 
the trajectory 
This package of computer programs, coupled with various plot 
routines, has been used extensively for investigating the 
transient energy in the system trajectories discussed in the 
various sections of this report. 
package II. 
From information obtained from Package I (specifically 
from the angles and velocities at clearing, and the post-fault 
Y-bus), the mode of instability promoted by the fault is 
determined; the machines with large velocities and angles are 
used to "suggest" a UEP that may control the instability for 
the specific sequence of events. in our procedure, the 
Davidon-Fletcher-Powell process (DFP routine provided by SCI) 
is started from the initial positions available to us from the 
study of the system trajectory, in this research, the 
resulting UEP was considered a candidate and was subject to 
confirmation by simulation studies. Knowing the controlling 
UEP (0^) makes it possible to compute the value of the margin 
AV. 
The package of programs calculates the transient energy 
margin as well as an estimate of additional power 
perturbations necessary to consume that margin. The 
information needed is obtained from the previous package; 
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0^^, Y-bus. In addition, the critical machines are 
identified. 
The program accomplishes the following tasks: 
10" 
o Computes AV = V 0=^ 
o Computes kinetic energy that does not contribute to 
instability, and, consequently, the 
corrected margin AV^ 
o When the post-fault network changes (i.e., whgn 
alternate lines are cleared), it recomputes 0 , 
and the corrected margin AV^ 
o For analytical purposes, computes and 
o Estimates a power injection required to consume 
this margin AV^ 
Except for the DFP routine, this entire package was developed 
specifically for this research project. A description of 
these programs is given in the Appendix. 
Identifying the Critical Generators 
A disturbance in a power system creates an imbalance 
between mechanical power into and electrical power out of each 
generator. If power-out exceeds power-in, the machine 
decelerates; if power-in exceeds power-out, the machine 
accelerates. The difference between power-in and power-out 
(that is, the accelerating power) is called mismatch. The 
rate of acceleration due to this mismatch depends upon the 
inertia constant of the machine. During the fault-on period, 
the mismatch imbalance is visualized as an injection of 
transient energy that splits the system, accelerating some 
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machines and decelerating others, depending on the system 
configuration during the disturbance. The result is that some 
machines (those most severely disturbed) will tend to separate 
from the rest of the system. The grouping promoted by this 
during-fault configuration may not be fully apparent at the 
end of the disturbance period. When the disturbance is 
removed (e.g., by clearing the fault), the post-disturbance 
configuration results in a new imbalance between power-in and 
power-out. This new mismatch produces synchronizing forces 
that tend to hold the system together and maintain system 
stability. Again, the forces vary in magnitude among the 
various machines. The post-fault trajectory and the resulting 
machine groupings reflect the combined effect of the disturbed 
system forces tending to separate some generators from the 
rest, and the post-disturbance forces tending to maintain 
synchronism. 
In many situations encountered in power systems, the 
group of generators that tends to separate from the rest of 
the system is clearly identifiable. The grouping promoted by 
the disturbance is not altered by the post-disturbance 
synchronizing forces. If the disturbance is large enough, 
these generators W'll, as a group, lose synchronism with the 
rest of the system (as governed by the motion of their 
inertial center, as discussed in Chapter 4). There are 
situations, however, in which the group of generators 
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initially separated from the system by the disturbance may not 
lose synchronism as a group; instead, only some of the 
generators of the group actually go unstable. When the 
disturbance is removed, the synchronizing forces are such that 
some generators of the group will remain in synchronism with 
the rest of the system, while the others in the group go 
unstable. This situation may be encountered when a number of 
power plants are concentrated in a small area of the network. 
The correct identification of the critical generators 
(and, hence, of the relevant UEP) for a particular sequence of 
events is essential in the determination of the transient 
energy margin. The critical generators seem to be those 
generators (within the significantly advanced group) that 
actually go unstable or are on the verge of going unstable. 
The selection must be made from the group of highly disturbed 
generators. The technique for choosing the critical 
generators, in this research, was to use the angles and speeds 
at clearing to suggest a UEP; the UEP was then used in 
computing the margin, but the UEP was subject to verification 
by inspection of the critical trajectory obtained in 
validating the results. In most cases, the relevant UEP 
coincided with the mode of instability actually encountered. 
The process of identifying the critical generators to obtain 
the relevant UEP will be illustrated by investigating faults 
on the 17-generator system. 
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Investigation of the 17-generator System 
For this system, the following disturbances are investigated: 
o A three-phase fault at Raun (Bus 372) cleared by 
opening line 372-193. 
o A three-phase fault at Council Bluffs (Bus 436) 
cleared by opening line 436-771. 
o A three-phase fault at Cooper (Bus 6) cleared by 
opening line 6-439. 
o A three-phase fault at Ft. Calhoun (Bus 773) 
cleared by opening line 773-779. 
using the techniques and computer program packages described 
in the previous sections, the controlling UEP for each 
disturbance is determined. This particular UEP (e.g., the UEP 
shown in Table 4-1) identifies the so-called critical 
machines, i.e., the generators tending to separate from the 
rest of the system. This information is checked against time 
solutions to make certain the identity of the critical 
generators. in some cases, several modes of instability were 
found to be possible for the same initial disturbance. 
For the Raun fault (near generator No. 6), the generators 
tending to separate from the system are generators No. 5 and 
6. This checks with the time solution shown in Figure 5-1. 
The critical energy predicted by the computer program 
(package II} shows the potential energy to be 16.66 pu (see 
Table 4-1). This is comparable to the corrected value of 
transient energy at critical clearing: 
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V gSl = 17.10 pu 
For the fault at Council Bluffs (near generators No. 10 
and 12)r the critical machines are generators No. 10 and 12. 
The swing curves for clearing near the critical clearing 
instant are shown in Figure 5-2. While it is possible for 
generator No. 12 to lose synchronism alone (t^ = 0.204), the 
slightest additional transient energy causes both generator 
No. 10 and generator No. 12 to become unstable (t^ = 0.206s). 
The critical energy for 9^^ is comparable to the 
corrected value of the transient energy at critical clearing. 
On the other hand, for is much lower and would 
predict a rather conservative critical clearing. Thus, 
although the critical trajectory would realize an instability 
involving machine No. 12 alone, the critical generators are 
taken to be generators No. 10 and 12. Here we differentiate 
between the mode of instability and the critical group. The 
machines that make up the critical group are those machines 
that are so severely disturbed as to be on the verge of going 
unstable. The ones that actually separate from the system and 
lose synchronism will depend on the duration of the fault. 
Those machines determine the mode of instability. In the case 
under discussion, generator 10 and 12 form the critical group, 
while the mode of instability is No. 12 alone going unstable. 
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This visualizes a critical trajectory that approaches the UEP 
for 10 and 12, but in fact only No. 12 goes^ unstable while No. 
10 recovers. 
The fault at Cooper (near generator No. 2) exhibits a 
behavior similar to that of the fault at Council Bluffs. 
Figure 5-3 shows the swing curves for the different clearing 
times. Generator No. 2 loses synchronism alone, unless 
considerably more transient energy is injected to cause 
generator No. 17 to lose synchronism as well (as for t^ = 0.30 
s). Thus, for practical purposes the critical group is that 
of No. 2 alone. This is confirmed by the fact that the 
critical energy for is comparable to the transient 
energy at critical clearing. 
The situation for the Ft. Calhoun fault (near generator 
No. 16) is more complex. Figures 5-4(a), 5-4(b), and 5-4(c) 
show the swing curves for six generators for t„ = 0.357 s, t^ 
= 0.4125 s, and t^ = 0.423 s, respectively. All three are 
unstable, but in (a) only No. 16 separates from the system; in 
(b) generators No. 2, 16, and 17 separate; in (c) all six 
generators lose synchronism (as does generator No. 6, which is 
not shown in the figure). Detailed investigation of the Ft. 
Calhoun fault shows that several modes of instability are 
possible, and each mode represents a critical group of 
machines (including generator No. 16, which is close to the 
fault). For each of these modes, a controlling UEP can be 
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identified, each with a corresponding critical energy. These 
UEPS have potential energies of similar magnitudes, i.e., in 
the range of 24.5 - 28.5 pu, and thus constitute a cluster of 
UEPS representing various possible modes. Therefore, 
identification of the controlling UEP is not an easy task. 
Only the most probable one, i.e., the UEP for which the 
critical energy most closely matches the energy values along 
the system trajectory, is selected based on the following 
reasoning: the disturbance tends to separate all of the 
generators on the Missouri River transmission corridor 
(generators No. 2,5,6,10,12,16, and 17) from the rest of the 
system. The energy level needed to separate this group is 
quite high (about 30 pu). As the system trajectory moves 
toward the UEP for this group, it encounters the cluster of 
UEPS with potential energy levels of 24.5-28.5 pu. This 
cluster controls the first swing stability for this 
disturbance. This is confirmed by the fact that the system 
trajectory of the critically unstable case (t^ = 0.357 s) has 
a potential energy of 24.6 at the point of inflection of 
Table 5-2 shows a summary of the cases for the four fault 
locations in terms of the critical generators, the critical 
energy predicted by the controlling UEP V^/ and the critical 
transient energy (obtained from the trajectory). 
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Table 5-2. Data for Critical Generators, 17-generator system 
•k 
Fault Critical Corrected V Corrected V ^ 
Generators (v^^) 
Raun 5,6 16.66 17.10 
C.B.#3 10,12 12.30 13.30 
Cooper 2 11.56 13.40 
Ft. Calhoun 16,2,10,12,17 28.25 24.90 
S1 
* with respect to 9 
Investigation of Critical Clearing Times 
Results of studies of system stability are conventionally 
reported in terms of critical clearing times. To put the 
transient energy margin analysis into these terms is not 
difficult: tne instant on the faulted trajectory when the 
transient energy margin becomes zero identifies the 
instant of critical clearing. 
The transient stability of the two test systems has been 
investigated to determine the critical clearing time for each 
of the faults discussed so far: one fault on the 4-generator 
systam and four faults on the 17-generator system. The 
results are compared to the trajectories obtained from time 
simulations. The results show in familiar terms how well the 
relevant UEP predicts stability. 
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Four-generator system 
The procedure is first applied to the four-generator test 
system. The disturbance investigated is the same as 
previously discussed (a three-phase fault at bus 10 cleared by 
opening line 8-10). Several clearing times are selected and 
displayed in Table 5-3. For each value of t^, the corrected 
values of the fault transient energy and the predicted 
critical transient energy are computed, together with the 
energy margin AV^,. The last column in Table 5-3 contains this 
value of the transient energy margin AV^ for diffenent 
clearing times. This transient energy margin must not be less 
Table 5-3. Fault transient energy for the 4-generator system, 
fault at bus 10. 
clearing corrected corrected 
s pu pu 
AV^ 
margin 
pu 
0 . 1  
0.148 
0.150 
0.153 
0.156 
0.159 
0.2076 
0.5258 
0.5450 
2.5671 
0.5967 
0.6306 
0.5703 
0.5703 
0.5703 
0.5703 
0.5703 
0.5703 
0.3627 
0.0445 
0.0253 
0.0032 
-0.0264 
—0.0603 
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than zero for stability to be maintained. The data indicate 
that the critical clearing time is between 0.153 s and 0.156 s 
(probably closer to 0.153 s). The swing curves for some of 
the cases displayed in Table 5-3 are shown in Figure 5-5. The 
rotor trajectory for generator No. 4 is shown for different 
clearing times. The time solution data indicate that the 
critical clearing time is between 0.156 and .159 s (probably 
closer to 0.156 s). The UEP predicts a critical clearing time 
that is within 0.006 s of the actual critical clearing time. 
17-generator System 
The corrected values of the transient energy margin for 
different values of clearing time (t^) are computed. The 
results for faults at Raun, Council Bluffs, Ft. Calhoun, and 
Cooper are displayed in the last column of Table 5-4. 
For the Raun fault, the results of Table 5-4 show that 
the critical clearing time which gives the zero transient 
energy margin is about t^ = 0.191 s. Swing curves for 
different clearing times for this disturbance, shown in Figure 
5-1, indicate that the clearing time of t^ = 0.1924 is 
critically unstable. Therefore, the critical clearing time 
predicted by a direct method compares favorably to that 
obtained by the time solution, e.g., within .0014 s. 
For the fault at Council Bluffs, the predicted critical 
clearing time, having a transient energy margin equal to zero, 
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Table 5-4. Fault transient energy for three-phase faults on 
the 17-generator system 
clearing 
AKE 
cor r 
pu 
V 
correc 
pu 
4 ed 
V 
corrected 
pu 
AVc. 
margin 
pu 
a) RAUN: critical generators 5,6 
0.15 1.119 9.167 16.664 7.497 
0.189 1.801 16.269 16.664 0.395 
0.1920 1.740 17.029 16.664 -0.365 
0.1924 1.774 17.116 16.664 -0.452 
0.1932 1.745 17.309 16.664 -0.645 
b) COUNCIL BLUFFS: critical generators 10,12 
0.15 2.497 5.935 12,301 6.336 
0.200 3.741 12.670 12.301 —0.369 
0.204 3.807 13.360 12.301 -1.059 
0.206 3.896 13.653 12.301 -1.352 
C) FT. CALHOUN: critical generators 2,10,12,16,17 
0.300 3.145 17.757 28.016 10.259 
0.350 3.938 23.874 28.016 4.142 
0.357 3.909 24.893 28.016 3.123 
0. 400 4.526 30.344 28.016 -2.328 
d) COOPER: critical generator 2 
0.150 3. 094 4.999 11.558 6.559 
0.204 4.765 11.763 11.558 -0.205 
216 5.411 13.444 11.558 -1.886 
,220 5.553 14.112 11.558 -2.554 
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is just under t^ = 0.200 s. The time solutions, shown in 
Figure 5-2, give a critical clearing time of just under t^ = 
0.204 s. This case is within 0.004 s of the correct value. 
For the Ft. Calhoun fault, the predicted critical 
clearing time is about 0.382 s. Time solutions, shown in 
Figure 5-6, give a critical clearing time of just under 0.357 
s. This case is within 0.025 s of the correct value. 
For the fault at Cooper, the predicted critical clearing 
time is about 0.204 s. The time solutions, shown in Figure 
5-7, give a critical clearing time of about 0.220 s. The 
predicted critical clearing time is within .016 s of the 
correct value. 
The discrepancies between actual and predicted clearing 
times are small; the worse case was Ft. Calhoun, with a 7% 
error in the predicted clearing time. 
Summary and Discussion 
Chapter 5 has introduced the transient energy margin 
function as computing the difference between the energy at 
clearing and the energy at the relevant UEP. When this 
function is properly evaluated (including a correction the 
kinetic energy that does not contribute to instability), the 
margin value is the value of the unused potential-energy-
storage-capacity remaining after a fault has been completely 
absorbed. Stability can be assessed by inspecting this margin 
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value. The technique was successfully used to determine 
critical clearing times for four disturbances on the Missouri 
River transmission corridor. Maximum error was only 7%. 
The results strongly suggest that the relevant UEP does 
provide a sufficiently accurate measure of critical energy and 
that the margin function can provide a first-swing transient 
stability assessment capability. The success of this method 
depends upon; 
o Identification of the controlling UEP for this 
disturbance 
o Accurate computation of the fault transient energy 
contributing to system separation 
The importance of the correction for the fault transient 
energy that does not contribute to instability is clearly 
evident: if the correction procedure is not used, the critical 
clearing time would be grossly in error (as much as 24% error 
in the critical clearing times). 
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CHAPTER 6. STABILITY ASSESSMENT USING THE TRANSIENT ENERGY 
MARGIN 
Assessing Stability of the System 
The significance of the transient energy margin lies in 
its ability to represent a "margin of safety" before 
instability occurs. A positive margin implies that a more 
severe disturbance can be withstood; further, the margin's 
magnitude measures how much more energy can be absorbed (i.e., 
in order to drive the margin to zero). Therefore, the 
transient energy margin evaluates the unused potential energy 
absorbing capacity of the system that is available after the 
disturbance energy has been absorbed. This value is computed 
using the relevant UEP 0^ which is the local minimum nearest 
the escape point encountered on the critical trajectory (see 
Chapter 2). Thus, the transient energy margin attempts to 
directly evaluate the capacity of the current operating system 
to withstand a specific disturbance. It reports the 
uncommitted or reserve energy absorbing capacity that is 
assured to exist; it assumes a trajectory directly through 
the local minimum-energy escape point (i.e., the UEP) that is 
relevant to the critical trajectory. In this way it assesses 
directly the energy terrain that the critically disturbed 
trajectory will traverse, and measures the robustness of the 
existing sj'stem configuration and the current operating 
condition when subjected to a given disturbance. 
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The Transient Margin as £ Tool 
The transient energy margin is envisioned as a tool to be 
used in the direct assessment of transient security. To be a 
useful tool for on-line assessment, the transient energy 
margin must function to compare many possible disturbances and 
to provide a meaningful measure of the robustness of the 
system for a given operating point. A significant question 
which had to be resolved in this research was whether the UEP 
used to estimate critical energy is accurate enough to produce 
a relative ranking of the disturbance, that is whether the 
predicted ranking will provide meaningful comparison between 
different faults and different clearing schemes. producing 
relative ranking is more difficult than merely calculating 
critical clearing. This task tests the uniformity of the 
predictions and the validity of comparing unrelated 
disturbances using the transient energy margin. 
A Basis for Qn-Line Stability Assessment 
A viable procedure for on-line transient stability 
assessment seems to be emerging from this research. Given a 
system operating at a steady state condition, on-line 
stability assessment requires the following steps: 
1. Assemble the system model. 
2. Formulate the required Y-bus matrices (i.e., 
pre-fault, during-fault, and post-fault). 
3c Determine the speeds and angles of the generators 
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c 3. 
atithe end of a particular disturbance (0 and 
). 
4. Determine the critical machines and the relevant 
UEP for that disturbance and post-fault network. 
5. Compute the transient energy margin, AV^. 
6. For other post-fault configurations (for the same 
disturbance), recompute the post-fault Y-bus, UEP, 
and margin. 
7. For different disturbances, repeat steps 2-5. 
8. Compile the energy margin results and report them 
in a meaningful way. 
These steps outline a procedure for using the transient 
energy margin as a tool for on-line stability assessment. The 
computational effort appears to be well within the 
capabilities available in modern control centers. In this 
respect, each step deserves some detailed discussion. 
Step 1: Assemble the System Model 
This research used s classical model (i.e., 
constant voltage behind transient reactance, 
constant impedance loads.) This model is suitable 
for simulation of first-swing transients for a 
study area that is part of a larger power network, 
proper equivalencing can be used to reduce the size 
of remote areas to produce a manageable number of 
machines. The Reduced Iowa System is a good 
example of such a model: the portion of the United 
States East of the Rocky Mountains was modeled with 
sufficient detail to provide meaningful security 
assessment. A 20-generator equivalent may be 
adequate for even a major power system. We note 
that the state of the art is such that on-line 
formulation of suitable equivalents is realizable, 
subject to some development work. 
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Step 2; Formulate the Required Y-Bus Matrices 
Formation of the Y-bus matrices that are required 
(pre-fault, faulted, and post-fault Y-bus) is one 
of the major computational steps of this assessment 
scheme. The task seems reasonable, however, in 
terms of fast on-line application, especially for 
systems with 20 machines or less. Furthermore, 
once the pre-fault Y-bus has been formed, it can 
easily be modified to obtain the faulted and 
post-fault Y-bus. One such technique, using the 
well-known Householder formulation was used in some 
parts of this project (42). 
c 1 c 1 
step 3: Determine 6 , a 
Once the disturbed system's Y-bus matrix has been 
formulated, the process of simulating the 
disturbance is a relatively small task. Transient 
simulation programs are readily available. 
Step 4: Determine 9^ and the Critical Machines 
Correctly identifying the critical machines and the 
controlling UEP, as we have explained in Chapter 5, 
is a crucial step. If the disturbance clearly 
splits a small number of generators from the 
system, this task may be straightforward. However, 
it is not a simple task when the disturbance is at 
a point"in the network at which the generators are 
clustered in a small area, and are electrically 
close to the disturbance (for example, the Ft. 
Calhoun disturbance in the 17-generator system). 
While conceptually this choice among the uE?s 
leaves an element of uncertainty as to the accuracy 
of the results, from a practical standpoint it can 
be readily overcome. For a given system, the 
critical machines associated with a particular 
disturbance can be determined in advance, using 
studies similar to that presented in Chapter 5. 
Step 5: Compute the Margin 
_cl cl _u 
From tne post-rauit y - d u s ,  0  , u , g ana 
identification of the critical machines, the 
transient energy margin is computed. This 
gives the margin for the particular disturbance 
under investigation (e.g., a 3-phase fault at a 
particular bus cleared in a specific manner). The 
computational effort involved in computing the 
margin is small. 
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Step 6: Recompute the Margin for Other Post-fault 
Networks 
For the same disturbance, there are usually several 
possible post-fault configurations that might be 
realized, e.g., other lines that might be cleared 
in removing the fault. The margin AV^ can be 
computed for these various post-fault network 
configurations as a variation of the previous step; 
the new UEP and AV^ are computed using the new 
post-fault Y-bus. Since the clearing conditions 
are the same, only the post-fault Y-bus is 
different. The computational effort is reduced, 
especially when a program for modifying (rather 
than recomputing) the previous y-bus is used. 
Step 7: Repeat Steps 2-5 for other Disturbances 
Steps 2 through 5 are repeated for different types 
of disturbances (3-phase and i-phase faults, 
reclosing sequences, stuck breaker sequences, 
etc.), and for different locations. Therefore, 
different types of disturbances at the same 
locations, and disturbances at other locations in 
the network, are investigated. The number of 
choices might be minimized by an on-line decision 
process that chooses only the worst cases 
applicable for the current operating conditions. 
Step 8; Results Compiled and Reported 
The results of the complete study (steps 1 through 
7) must be compiled and reported in a way that 
provide meaningful information about the status of 
the system security. The report must identify the 
weaknesses in the system in a way that suggests the 
source of the problem and a possible solution. 
Normalizing the Transient Energy Margin 
Step 8 in the above procedure is very important. Having 
computed the values of the transient energy margin AV^ for 
various disturbances, what inferences can be made? How can 
security be assessed, using the values of the transient energy 
margin for the various disturbances? This introduces an 
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obvious question: will the margin of AV^ = 6.0 pu always 
indicate a more robust system (farther from instability) than 
that of a situation in which the margin is AV^ = 5.0 pu? 
Intuitively, the answer is: no. Although the transient energy 
margin is indicative of the unused transient energy absorbing 
capacity after a particular fault has been fully absorbed as 
potential energy, its magnitude is of significance only as it 
compares with the transient energy injected into the system by 
the fault. For this reason, we proceed by normalizing the 
transient energy margin before the margin values are compared. 
At clearing, for stability to be maintained, the 
component of transient energy that must be converted into 
potential energy (including the dissipative component), is the 
corrected transient kinetic energy (i.e., the kinetic energy 
at clearing corrected for that component not contributing to 
instability). The true margin of safety, therefore, is 
measured by comparing the margin AV^ to the corrected kinetic 
energy. In other words, a more meaningful measure of the 
robustness of the system is the ratio of the margin energy to 
the corrected kinetic energy, a ratio which provides a 
normalized energy marg in AV^^ : 
AVn = ^^c^^^^corr 
(6-1) 
A different form of the same normalized energy margin is the 
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percent margin: 
%iV = [AV^/{AV^ + 100% 
(6-2) 
Those two definitions are based on the same normalizing 
concept, and one can be derived directly from the other: 
%AV = [AV^/tl + AV^)] 100% 
(6-3) 
The normalized form given in equation 6-1 gives the margin 
energy per unit of disturbance energy, i.e., it is a measure 
of how many more such kinetic energy disturbances could be 
withstood. A margin of AV^ = 2.5 means that "2 1/2 more such 
kinetic energy disturbances" could be safely absorbed. A zero 
margin implies critical stability. 
The percent margin, given in equation 5-2, compares the 
unused margin to the potential energy available at clearing. 
This assesses the reserve potential energy capacity remaining 
unused after the fault has been absorbed. This form might 
appeal to operators, since it offers a more realistic physical 
meaning. The value is always less than 100; a margin of %AV = 
45% would mean that the fault left 45% of the kinetic energy 
absorbing capacity unused. Again, a zero margin would imply 
critical stability. 
The choice between the two normalizing definitions is 
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strictly a matter of preference. 
Transient Energy Margin profile of the 17-Machine System 
a s  explained in Chapter 3» the 17-generator test system 
is a reduced equivalent of the network of the State of Iowa. 
The study system, which is represented in sufficient detail 
for transient analysis, is the western area of the network, 
including the area known in this dissertation as the Missouri 
River transmission corridor. Seven generating plants are 
located along this corridor. The initial operating condition 
is the same as that used throughout this dissertation: the 
1980 network, with 80% loads, and a prior outage of the 
Raun-Hinton line (Line 372-332). Details of these operating 
conditions are given in reference (42). 
The normalized energy margin was computed for 37 cases: 
13 3-phase faults and 24 single-line-to-ground faults with 
stuck breakers assumed. The results represent a transient 
energy margin profile of the 17-generator system. This 
information would be potentially useful for transient 
stability assessment of that system. 
Types of pi sturbances 
The 17-generator Reduced Iowa System was investigated for 
disturbances at four busses on the Missouri River transmission 
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corridor : 
o bus 372 (near Raun) 
o bus 436 (near Council Bluffs) 
o bus 773 (near Ft. Calhoun) 
o bus 6 (near Cooper) 
Two types of faults were considered at each location: 
o A three-phase fault, applied to the high voltage 
(345 kv) transformer terminal, cleared at 0.15 s (9 
cycles) by clearing one line. (While the actual 
breaker clearing time is 0.08 s or 6 cycles, the 
9-cycle fault duration was chosen to match cases 
which were already available and which would be too 
costly to repeat.) No reclosing sequences were 
considered. 
o A single-line-to-ground fault, with a breaker 
failure, eventually cleared by backup protection. 
The sequence assumed was: 
One-line-to-ground fault applied, with clearing 
attempted at .08 s (6 cycles); the breaker 
close to the fault is assumed to have failed to 
open, so only the distant end of the line is 
opened. 
Back-up protection isolates the fault at 0.24 
s. With the activation of backup protection, 
secondary lines might also be cleared. 
Post-fault Networks 
For each of the four fault locations and both of the 
fault sequences described above, the schematic diagrams for 
the breaker are inspected to determine all realizable 
post-fault network configurations that can result. The 
schematic diagrams are shown in Figure 6-1, for Raun, and 
Figure 6-2, for the other fault locations. The result of the 
combination of possible fault locations, types, and post-fault 
networks is 37 fault cases: 13 three-phase faults, and 24 
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single-phase faults. The different post-fault networks are 
given below; 
Three-phase Faults For the Raun fault, with 
prior outage of the 372-332 (raun-Hinton) line, the 
following post-fault networks are possible: 
o Line 372-193 (Lakefield) cleared. 
o Line 372-773 (Ft. Calhoun) cleared, 
o Line 372-482 (Lehigh) cleared. 
o One of the transformers 372-800 (Raun) 
opened. 
For the Council Bluffs fault, the following 
post-fault networks are possible: 
0 Line 436-439 (Booneville) cleared. 
0 Line 431-771 (Substation 3456) cleared. 
For the Ft. Calhoun fault, the following post-fault 
networks are possible: 
o Line 773-372 (Raun) cleared. 
o Line 773-779 (Wagner) cleared. 
o Line 773-775 (Substation 3459) cleared. 
For the Cooper fault, the following post-fault 
networks are possible: 
o Line 6-774 (Nebraska City) cleared, 
o Line 6-439 (Booneville) cleared. 
o Line 6-16 (Moore) cleared. 
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o Line 6-393 (St. Joseph) cleared. 
Singie-line-to-ground Faults For the Raun 
fault, the following switching sequences are 
possible : 
o Fault on line 372-193 
—Line 372-193 cleared. 
—Lines 372—193 and 372—482 cleared, 
o Fault on line 372-773 
—Line 372—773 cleared. 
o Fault on line 372-482 
—Line 372-482 cleared. 
—Line 372-482 and 372-193 cleared, 
o Fault on transformer 372-800 
—One line 372-800 cleared. 
For the Council Bluffs fault, the following 
switching sequences are possible; 
o Fault on line 436-439 
—Line 435—439 cleared, 
—Line 436-439 and 436-771 cleared, 
o Fault on line 436-771 
--Line 436-771 cleared. 
—Line 436—771 and 436—439 cleared. 
For the Ft, Calhoun fault, the following switching 
sequences are possible: 
o Fault on line 773-372 
135 
—Line 773-372 cleared. 
—Line 773-372 and 773-775 cleared. 
o Fault on line 773-779 
—Line 773-779 cleared. 
——Lines 773—779 and 773—775 cleared, 
o Fault on line 773-775 
--Line 773-775 cleared. 
—Lines 773-775 and 773-372 cleared. 
—Lines 773-775 and 773-779 cleared. 
For the Cooper fault, the following switching 
sequences are possible: 
o Fault on line 6-774 
—Line 6-774 cleared. 
—Lines 6-774 and 6-393 cleared. 
—Lines 6-774 amd 6-16 cleared. 
o Fault on line 6-439 
—Line 6-439 cleared. 
--Lines 6-439 and 6-393 cleared. 
o Fault on line 6-16 
--Line 6-16 cleared. 
—Lines 6-16 and 6-774 cleared. 
Limitations of the Study 
A full transient security assessment study would not be 
limited to faults at only four locations. A full study would 
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represent a large number of possible fault locations, fault 
types, and network configurations. prior outages, other than 
the Raun-Hinton outage assumed in this study, would further 
multiply this number. Since our objective is to demonstrate 
the value of for use in on-line security assessment, the 
37 cases in this study represent only a limited number of the 
possible configurations. The strategy that would ultimately 
be used to apply the energy margin in a security assessment 
scheme would undoubtedly include a "smart" contingency 
selection procedure designed to limit the number of cases 
considered. 
A Sample Calculation 
In order to clarify the security assessment procedure 
used in this chapter, a sample of calculations is given for a 
three-phase and single-line-to-ground fault. The fault 
location is at Raun (near generator No. 6), cleared by opening 
line 372-193. As stated previously, the three-phase fault is 
cleared at 0.15 s, while the single-line-to-ground fault 
assumes the far end of the transmission line 372-193 is 
cleared at 0.08 s, with the backup protection clearing the 
fault at 0.24 s. In this case, the backup protection does not 
clear any secondary lines. 
Table 6-1 shows the speeds and angles at clearing for the 
two faults, as well as the relevant UEP . In this case. 
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only one UEP is obtained, since the post-fault network is 
identical for the three-phase and single-phase faults. Had a 
second line been cleared by the backup protection, a second 
UEP would have been computed, reflecting the change in the 
post-fault network configuration. 
The data used in calculating the transient energy margin, 
and its corresponding kinetic energy correction, are shown in 
Table 6-2. The table displays data for the kinetic energy 
correction computed using the energy of the equivalent 
two-machine system. Inspecting the data, we note the 
following : 
o The kinetic energy correction represents an 18% 
adjustment to the energy margin in the three-phase 
fault, and a 4% adjustment in the margin for the 
single-phase fault. This kinetic energy correction 
is positive (as it must always be), and serves to 
increase the margin (Other than the kinetic 
energy correction, no additional corrections were 
made to AV.) 
o The value of AV for the single-line-to-ground fault 
is greater than that of the three-phase fault. 
This is to be expected; when backup protection does 
not clear additional lines, the single-phase fault 
is a less severe disturbance than the three-phase 
fault. 
o The margin energy of the single-phase fault is 
nearly twice that of the three-phase fault; 
additionally, the kinetic energy of the three-phase 
fault is more than triple the kinetic energy of the 
single-phase fault. Consequently, the normalized 
margin indicates the single-phase fault to be 
six times'more robust than the three-phase fault. 
o Another way to state this comparison is using the 
percent margin 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
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6-1. Conditions at clearing and the corresponding UEP, 
fault at bus 372, line 372-193 cleared 
9^ 1 e" 8" 
(degrees) (degrees) (degrees) 
Arbitrary COI COI (for this transient) 
Reference Reference Reference COI Reference 
-27.92 -6.26 -4.92 -1.41 
-1.37 20.28 22.26 46.63 
-16.28 5.38 5.60 9.68 
-26.09 -4.42 -8.34 -23.95 
-6-24 15.41 18.87 163.55 
-4.56 17.10 21.57 144.87 
-23.02 -1.35 -1.53 -15.96 
-26.95 -5.29 -4.76 -7.98 
-12.41 9.25 8.91 -6.62 
-11.12 10.53 12.85 47.77 
-24.30 -2.64 -1.17 10.28 
-10.10 11.55 13.90 49.58 
-28.10 -6.44 -6.61 -25.80 
-26.76 -5.10 -5.08 -23.62 
-21.09 0.56 -2.12 -17.61 
-6.70 14.95 17.78 63.55 
-4.35 17.30 19.43 50.06 
Table 6-2. Calculation oli the Transient Energy Margin, fault at bus 372 (Raun), 
line 372-193 cleared 
Wcr "cr '''sys ^sys KE A K B c o r r  AV A V c  A V n  %AV 
3-phase 
fault 7.0650 0.2614 3597 4.8744 6.84 1.1311 6 « 377 7.508 1.10 5 2 %  
1-phase 
fault 3.6383 0.2614 --o 1952 4.8744 1.82 0.462 12. 075 12.537 6.80 87% 
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%AV = 87% vs %AV = 52% 
which indicates that 87% of the energy absorbing 
capacity at clearing remained unused for the 
single-line-to-ground fault, while only 52% remains 
for the three-phase fault. 
Assessment Using the Transient Energy Margin 
Thirty-seven fault cases were run on the Reduced Iowa 
System, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Thirteen cases 
proved to be uninteresting, because—as with the sample 
calculation above—the single-line-to-ground faults, with no 
additional line cleared, showed transient energy margins AV^ 
consistently higher than the corresponding three-phase fault 
or the single-phase, fault with secondary lines cleared. 
Therefore, we will not examine these disturbances any further. 
The results of the calculations for the remaining 13 
three-phase faults and 11 single-phase-to-ground faults are 
tabulated in Table 6-3. The energy margin, together with the 
two normalized energy margins (AV_ and %AV) are indicated for 
each case. The three-phase disturbances had energy margins 
Aranging between 4.756 pu and 27.685 pu. The 
one-phase-to-ground fault ranged between 0.963 pu and 27.694 
pu. The normalized margin ranged from a low of 0.691 pu 
to a high of 21=272 for the three-phase case, and between a 
low of 0.962 and a high of 146.374 for the one-phase fault 
cases. The %AV margin ranged from 41% to 96% in the 
three-phase case, and from 49% to 99% in the single-line fault 
cases. 
Table 6-3. Normalized Transient Energy Margin, 17-machine 
system 
Three-phase Fault 
Corrected 
KE 
(Bus and Line Faulted) (pu) (pu) (pu) (%) 
Fault Location %AV 
Raun Fault 
372-193 7.432 6.878 1.080 52 
372-773 4.756 6.878 0.691 41 
Transformer 372-800 12.147^ 6.878 1.766 64 
372-482 9.159, 6.878 1.332 57 
Council Bluffs Fault 
436-439 12.831 3.831 3.283 77 
436-771 6.208 3.831 1.620 62 
Ft, Calhoun Fault 
773-372 22.513 1.302 17.291 95 
773-779 27.512 1.302 21.131 95 
773-775 27.685 1.302 21.272 96 
Cooper Fault 
6-774 5.200 3.158 1.647 62 
6-439 6.502 3.158 2.059 67 
6-16 6.278 3.158 1.988 67 
6-393 6.596 3.158 2.089 68 
^ See discussion of table 5-4. 
% A V  
(%) 
81 
81 
81 
67 
97 
98 
99 
99 
85 
49 
77 
85 
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SLG Fault 
Corrected 
AV„ KE AV 
(pu) (pu) (pu) 
7.879 1.824 4.319 
7.523 1.791 4.200 
4.350 0.998 4.354 
3.408 1.658 2.057 
21.980 0.643 34.205 
27.097 0.498 54.379 
22.660 0.189 119.767 
27.694 0.189 146.374 
5.561 1.002 5.530 
0.963 1.002 0.962 
3.217 0.969 3.321 
5.457 0.975 5.596 
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Ranking of the Disturbances 
Table 6-4 shows the ranking of the three-phase faults, 
tabulated in decreasing order; the most severe disturbances, 
with the lowest margin, are shown first. The transient energy 
margin and the normalized values (ZiV^ and %AV) are shown 
for all 13 three-phase Faults. Critical clearing times for 
some of these faults were obtained to test the validity of the 
ranking. This information is also given in Table 6-4. In 
Table 6-4, we observe the following: 
o The data show the critical clearing time for each 
disturbance. It is clear that the relative ranking 
offered by this technique provided very good 
results; the critical clearing time increases 
consistently with the increased ranking. This is 
particularly significant when it is realized that 
some of the critical clearing times differ in terms 
of thousandths of a second. 
o There is a discrepancy at the Raun transformer 
(372-800, ranked fourth in Table 6-4): the data in 
Table 6-4 does not match that shown in Table 6-3. 
The reason for this discrepancy is that Table 6-3 
assumes a critical group (and the UEP) that 
includes machines 5 and 6. Direct simulation, used 
to validate the UEP and determine the critical 
clearing time, showed the critical machine to 
agtually be generator No. 6 alone. Using the new 
0 , corresponding to machine No. 6 alone, the 
following values are obtained: 
AV = 9.87 pu 
= 1.53 
%AV = 60 % 
These values are used to formulate the ranking and 
are shown in Table 6-4. 
Table 6-4. Ranking of the thr 
Rank AV^ %AV 
1 0.691 41 
2 1.080 52 
3 1.332 57 
4 1.530 60 
5 1.620 62 
6 1.647 62 
7 1.988 67 
8 2.059 67 
9 2.089 68 
10 3.293 77 
11 17.298 95 
12 21.139 95 
13 21.272 96 
AV 
4.756 
7.432 
9.159 
9.870 
6. 208 
5. 200 
6.278 
6.502 
6.596 
12.579 
22.513 
27.512 
27.685 
phase faults shown in Table 6-3 
clearing times 
Fault Location stable Unstable 
Raun, line 372-773 0.117 0.180 
Raun, line 372-193 0.1923 0.1924 
Raun, line 372,482 0.192 0.196 
Raun, transformer 372-800 0.196 0.200 
Council Bluffs, line 436-771 0.200 0.204 
Cooper, line 6-774 0.204 0.212 
Cooper, line 6-16 0.212 0.216 
Cooper, line 6-439 0.216 0.220 
Cooper, line 6-393 
Council Bluffs, line 436-439 
Ft. Calhoun, line 773-372 
Ft. Calhoun, line 773-779 0.345 0.356 
Ft. Calhoun, line 773-775 
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Ranking According to the transient energy margin 
predicted that the fault at Raun (clearing line 
372-482) with a transient margin of 9.159 pu is 
more severe than other faults with considerably 
smaller values of AV^,. For example, the Council 
Bluffs fault (clearing line 436-771) has an energy 
margin of 6.208 pu, but is predicted by the 
normalizing process to be more severe. The 
information about critical clearing times indicates 
that this, indeed, is correct. 
The normalized margin appears to be capable of 
separating closely clustered cases into a proper 
ranking, even when the disturbances are similar in 
nature (e.g., on the same bus) and differ only 
according to which lines are cleared. For example, 
the cases ranked as 7 and 8 in Table 6-4 have 
normalized margins that differ by only a small 
amount; nonetheless, the ranking seems correct, as 
validated by the critical clearing times. 
o The ability of the normalized margin to separate 
closely clustered cases seems to hold, even when 
the cases are not at the same location, and when 
the energy margins differ substantially (i.e., as 
in the cases ranked 4 and 5). 
o An important question is whether the critical 
clearing times provide a true means of comparing 
unrelated faults that differ in location and type. 
It remains unclear what is involved in the 
comparison of the severity of a fault at one 
location with one at another location. Clearly, 
however, the top of the list represents the weak 
links in the system; the most severe response is at 
Raun (with a margin of 41%), where over half of the 
energy absorbing capacity which remained after 
clearing was consumed by the fault kinetic energy. 
o Table 6-4 not only gives the operator knowledge 
that trouble is possible, but, by identifying the 
source of the problem, implies solutions for the 
operator's consideration. For example, it is clear 
from the above assessment that the three-phase 
disturbance at Raun and the stuck breaker fault at 
Cooper are the two conditions that come closest to 
threatening the system. Off-loading these 
generators will increase the margins. 
The 11 single-line-to-ground faults, cleared with backup 
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protection after a breaker failure, are now ranked according 
to the same criterion. This information is displayed in Table 
6-5. No information is given in Table 6-5 about the time 
solution. The computer program packages described in Chapter 
5 do not have the capability of simulating single-phase 
faults. For this reason, the exhaustive studies needed to 
confirm the critical group encountered in each 
single-line-to-ground fault were not feasible. Consequently, 
the ranking given in Table 6-5 is based on the assumption that 
the modes of instability and the identification of the 
critical group are the same as those encountered for the 
three-phase faults. 
The Alert State 
An important issue still must be resolved; how do we 
assess the stability of the system with this information? One 
very elementary approach is; merely choose a limit to the 
normalized margin, and alert the operator if this limit is 
violated. 
A key question in this process is ; what is the value of 
the normalized transient energy margin which constitutes an 
alertable situation? There is no clear answer to this 
question. One possibility, that is purely arbitrary, is to 
use a scheme that alerts the operator if the normalized margin 
becomes less than 1.0 (this corresponds to a percent 
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Table 6-5. Ranking of single-phase faults, 17-generator 
system 
Disturbance 
Rank AVj^ AV^ Faulted Bus Lines Removed 
1 0. 962 0. 963 Cooper 6-774, 6-•393 
2 2. 057 3. 408 Council Bluffs 436-771, 436-439 
3 3. 321 3. 217 Cooper 6-439, 6-•393 
4 4. 200 7. 523 Raun 372-482, 372-193 
5 4. 319 7. 879 Raun 372-193, 372-•482 
6 4. 354 4. 350 Council Bluffs 436-439, 436-•771 
7 5. 550 5. 561 Cooper 6-774, 6--16 
8 34. 205 21. 980 Ft. Calhoun 773-372, 773-•775 
9 54. 379 27. 097 Ft. Calhoun 773-779, 773--775 
10 119. 767 22. 660 Ft. Calhoun 773-775, 773--372 
11 146. 374 27. 694 Ft. Calhoun 773-775, 773--779 
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transient margin %a V of 50%). Fouad et al. (48) suggested the 
following criteria: 
Situation '^^n Suggested Action 
Warning 1.0-2.0 None 
Alert 0.5-1.0 Diagnostic 
Severe 0.0-0.5 Diagnostic 
Alert Suggest remedial 
action 
Potential <0 Same 
Emergency 
It is emphasized by Fouad, however, that this classification 
is arbitrary and judgemental. The ultimate choice of the 
alert criteria should be made at the local level and be based 
on the system operating policy. 
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CHAPTER 7. SECURITY ASSESSMENT USING A MODIFIED TRANSIENT 
ENERGY MARGIN 
The key to accurately assessing transient stability by 
the procedure presented in Chapter 6 is the correct 
determination of a) the critical potential energy value, 
and of b) the kinetic energy component which does not 
contribute to instability. The value of has been 
carefully studied, and Chapter 4 has shown that, for all 
practical purposes, the UEP energy, may be taken as the 
critical potential energy, Chapter 5 utilized a kinetic 
energy correction based on system trajectories at the instant 
of clearing. Chapter 6 used this technique to produce a 
highly accurate ranking of various disturbances. 
Nevertheless, an in-depth look at the nature of the kinetic 
energy not contributing to instability is still necessary, and 
that is the purpose of this chapter. 
The additional work covered by this chapter showed the 
kinetic energy not contributing to instability to be a very 
sensitive parameter; its value changes drastically with small 
changes in the system. This may be a major obstacle in that 
it brings into question the reliability of the previous 
assessment procedure for practical on-line decision-making. 
Consequently, an alternate technique is proposed in this 
chapter. In this new technique, the value of the kinetic 
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energy is not sensitive, and is, therefore, reliable for 
on-line decision-making. Thus, Chapter 7 addresses the 
question of.reliable application of the energy margin and 
points the direction for additional research on this subject. 
Kinetic Energy not Contributing to Instability 
The kinetic energy not contributing to instability is 
merely the kinetic energy possessed by the system at the point 
of escape on the critical trajectory. It is the kinetic 
energy at the so-called stationary instant: when the 
center-of-inertia of the unstable group is at zero velocity 
with respect to the center-of-inertia of the stable group, and 
when the synchronizing force between these two groups has 
dropped to zero. 
The motion of the machines at this instant is motion 
around the two stationary inertial centers and does not 
contribute to the separation of the two groups. Thus, the 
kinetic energy of this motion, in effect, absorbs (or 
consumes) a portion of the transient energy injected into the 
system by the fault. This portion of the transient energy is 
a contribution to stability. Therefore, to accurately assess 
stability we must compute the capacity of the system to absorb 
fault energy as both potential energy and kinetic energy and 
remain stable. 
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The Role of Kinetic Energy in Absorbing Fault Energy 
In order to understand the role of both potential and 
kinetic energy in absorbing fault energy, it is helpful to 
inspect the process by which the fault energy drives the 
system unstable. At question is: 
1. Where does the fault kinetic energy go (as 
potential and kinetic energy) in driving the 
system unstable? 
2. What exactly is the smallest amount of kinetic 
energy that can drive the system unstable? 
3. What exactly is the portion of this kinetic energy 
that is not contributing to instability? 
In answering these questions, it is first necessary to 
establish exactly how fault energy drives the system unstable. 
To do this it is necessary to firmly establish the critical 
potential-energy-capacity of a system and the manner in which 
this capacity is exceeded by the fault-injected energy. 
Only the case of a simple 1-machine instability is 
considered. Consideration of more complex cases, with 
ill-defined modes of separation, is proposed as a topic for 
further study. 
Potential Energy Computed via Numerical Integration 
The critical energy (V^^) is identified by direct 
numerical integration of the values of potential energy stored 
by individual machines, using digital computer simulation of 
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critical trajectories. This critical potential energy is then 
compared to the fault-injected energy to determine the exact 
amount required to drive the system unstable. 
Numerical integration of the values of potential energy 
is relatively easy to accomplish. Figure No. 7-1 illustrates 
the potential energy of interest, using a one-machine, 
infinite-bus system. The power-angle curve of this system is 
re-drawn, with time as its abscissa rather than angle. The 
horizontal line, P-, is the mechanical power reduced by the 
constant dissipation. The curved line, P^, is the electrical 
power transmitted through the transmission lines. The 
difference between and P^ at each instant is called 
mismatch power. The area under P^ and above P^ (Area A) 
defines the potential-energy-absorbing capacity of the 
generator. This is the limit to the generator's ability to 
absorb potential energy by virtue of its angular position. 
This area can be found by numerical integration during the 
computer simulation of the faulted system trajectory between 
the two equilibrium points t^ and t^ : 
P.E. = I [Pi - Pg] dt 
^1 (7-1) 
For machine i of an n-machine system, p^ (the mechanical 
power reduced by constant dissipation) is : 
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P 
PREFAULT POSTFAULT 
P 1 
FAULTED 
t 
Figure 7-1. Power-time curve (p^) for one-machine-infinite-
bus system (transfer conductances neglected). 
Area A between t^ and t^, defines the potential-
energy-absorbing-capacity of the generator 
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The (electrical power 
system) is: 
n 
P . = 2 [E.E.E.. sine +E.E. cosS ] 
i=l ] ] ij ^ ^ ij 
i/j (7-3) 
For machine i of an n-machine system, the integration of power 
(to give potential energy) between the two equilibrium points 
t^ and t^ (see figure 7-1) becomes: 
h 
P.E.i =y [P. - P^. - (Mi/Mt)Pcoi] dt 
^1 (7-4) 
The numerical integration of this function uses the expression 
P.E.,= E " 
(7-5) 
where tj^ is the time at each step in the computer simulation 
between the two zero mismatch points (t^ and t^) encountered 
on the fault trajectory. The numerical integration is easily 
accomplished within a transient stability program. Care must 
be taken, however, in computing mismatch: the mismatch power 
must be computed using the post-fault admittance values for 
the entire period between t^ and t^. 
= - ^ ÏGii 
(7-2) 
transmitted through the transmission 
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Analysis of Energy for the Ft. Calhoun Instability 
This study investigated a three-phase fault applied to 
Bus NO.J773 (near Ft. Calhoun) on the 17-generator reduced 
Iowa System. Two cases were run. In one case, the fault was 
cleared at .3528 seconds and the system remained stable. In 
the second case, the fault was cleared at .3564 seconds and 
machine No. 16 (Ft. Calhoun) became unstable. In both cases, 
the fault was cleared by removing the 345 kv line between Ft. 
Calhoun and sub 3454 (Bus No. 779). These two cases are, 
respectively, the critically stable and critically unstable 
cases, and thus bracket the actual critical trajectory. 
Analysis of Potential Energy 
The two Fort Calhoun cases were simulated, and the 
potential energy absorbed by the generator was computed, using 
the numerical integration technique described above. Figure 
7-2 depicts these two cases: (a) and (b) show selected machine 
trajectories, and (c) and (d) show the corresponding 
power-time curves for generator No. 16. The results of the 
numerical integration for generator No. 16 are also indicated 
on this figure. Figure 7-2(e) shows selected power-time 
curves for the other 16 generators for the unstable case. 
Establishing the Critical Instant The disturbance 
sends generator No. 16 toward instability. In the critical 
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but stable trajectory, generator No. 16 reaches the peak of 
its swing, with respect to all other generators, at t = .704. 
This is tlie stationary instant when generator No. 16 is at 
zero velocity with respect to the inertial center of the 16 
other generators. We indicate this condition as 
"16 ' ® 
where the bar indicates velocity with respect to the inertial 
center of the 16 other machines. (This is in contrast to the 
nomenclature, w , which indicates velocity with respect to 
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the 17-generator inertial center.) 
In the critical but unstable trajectory, there is no 
peak-of-the-swing for No. 16, but instead the critical instant 
is seen as a reversal in the acceleration of No. 16 with 
respect to the inertial center of the other 16 generators. 
The result is a point-of-inflection as the acceleration 
becomes momentarily zero. We indicate this condition as 
"16 = ® 
In the critical but unstable case, this point-of-inflection 
occurs at t = .804s. 
p.E. at the Critical Instant; Unstable Generator The 
numerical integration for generator No. 16 determines the area 
under the power-time curve. This depicts the potential energy 
stored by generator No. 16. Since the two cases represent the 
critically stable and the critically unstable cases, the 
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resulting potential energy brackets the exact critical energy 
of generator No. 16. For the stable case, the potential 
energy stored by No. 16 at the instant of zero velocity, 
(Q^g=0), is 12.2409 pu (see Figure 7-2(c)). For the unstable 
case, the potential energy stored at the instant of the 
point-of-inflection (û3^g=0) is 12.300 pu (see Figure 7-2(d)). 
We conclude that machine No. 16 has a maximum potential energy 
capacity (critical energy) of 
12.2409 < ^cz(16) ^ ^2.300 pu 
The exact value of lies within this range and is the 
potential energy stored at the point on the critical 
trajectory satisfying the condition: 
=16 
-16 = ® 
This condition specifies the stationary point on the critical 
trajectory, and is the crucial point-of-no-return for the 
disturbance. 
P.E. at the Critical Instant; Other Generators For 
the fault cleared at .3564s, the total potential energy stored 
by all 16 stable generators at the critical instant is 
P.E. = 11.634 pu 
The potential energy stored by all 17 generators is the sum of 
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the potential energy of generator No. 16 (P.E. = 12.300 pu) 
and the 16 other generators (P.E. = 11.634 pu), or 
P.E. = 23.934 pu 
For the critical trajectory, not one other generator 
reached the point where tô=0 (i.e., the second zero mismatch 
point corresponding to t^ in Figure 7-1). Thus, though the 
numerical integration can compute the potential energy 
absorbed, it cannot compute the maximum capacity of those 
machines. Clearly the 16 stable generators do absorb a 
significant amount of transient energy. However, the stable 
generators do not exceed their critical energy values. We are 
focusing only on the potential energy stored in generator No. 
15 because it exceeded its potential energy capacity. No 
other generator reached its capacity; no other generator went 
unstable. 
P.E. at Clearing The critically stable case is 
cleared at t = 0.3528 s. As seen in Figure No. 7-2(c), 
generator No. 16 has absorbed 4.1279 pu of its capacity at 
this instant, leaving 8.1130 units of potential energy 
capacity remaining. (The 16 other generators have absorbed 
12.010 units of potential energy at clearing, giving a total 
potential energy absorbed by all 17 generators at clearing of 
P.E. = 16.138 pu.) 
The critically unstable case was cleared at t = 0.3564 s. 
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Figure 7-2(d) indicates that generator No. 16 absorbed 4.2343 
pu of potential energy, leaving 8.0661 pu of potential energy 
capacity remaining. (The 16 other generators have absorbed 
12.280 units of potential energy giving a 17-generator total 
of P.E. = 16.514 pu.) We conclude that, for generator No. 16, 
the potential energy capacity remaining at clearing is 
8.0661 < P.E. < 8.1130 pu 
as indicated in Figure 7-2(c) and (d). 
Analysis of Kinetic Energy 
Finding a value for the critical potential energy is only 
half of the energy accounting problem. The other half is 
evaluating the kinetic energy. 
For the stable case the total system kinetic energy at 
clearing is given (by simulation) as 
KE = 11.824 pu 
while the kinetic energy at clearing for the unstable case is 
given as 
KE = 11.958 pu 
We conclude that the critical total system kinetic energy is 
11.824 < KE < 11.958 pu 
We are interested in determining generator No. 16s share 
of this fault-injected kinetic energy at the critical instant 
on the critical trajectory. The critical instant is the point 
on the critical trajectory that exactly satisfies the 
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condition 
fl6 ' ® 
^16 = « 
(7-
The kinetic energy at this instant is the kinetic energy not 
contributing to instability. The value of kinetic energy at 
this instant is not known because the critical trajectory is 
not known. However, the critical trajectory is closely 
bracketed by the stable and unstable cases. The situation a 
the critical instant is estimated by interpolation between 
these stable cases. (Table 7-1 summarizes the data for the 
two cases.) 
The Stable Case The critically cleared but 
stable case has a kinetic energy of 3.16 pu (as 
determined by simulation) when ÛTg=0, 03^^ = 0. The 
3.16 units of energy is from motion of generators 
around the stationary center of inertia of the 
stable group and does not contribute to the 
unstable motion of No. 16. This 3.16 units of 
kinetic energy, therefore, is the portion of the 
11.824 units of fault-injected kinetic energy that 
does not contribute to the separation of No. 16. 
The 3.16 pu is not absorbed as potential energy. 
Instead, we find that, at the stationary instant, 
the system, has absorbed 
11.824 - 3.16 = 8.66 pu 
of the kinetic energy that was injected at 
clearing. (This number is entered in Table 7-1.) 
We note (with considerable interest) that Figure 
7-2(c) shows the energy absorbed by generator No. 
16 only to be 8.113 pu (found by numerical 
integration). Thus, it appears that at this 
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Table 7-1. Interpolation between the stable case (cleared 
at 0.3528s) and the unstable case (cleared at 
0.3564s) to estimate the critical p.E. of 
generator No. 16 
critically 
stable 
1  
1 critically 
! unstable 
interpolated | 
estimate | 
1  total k E  i  
1  at clearing j  
11.824 1 11.958 11.884 1 
I k e  when S,^=0 | 
lor ^,,.0 1 
3.16 1 4.57 3.80 1 
1 portion of K E  1 
1 contributing to 1 
1 instability | 
8.66 1 7.39 8.09 1 
1PE of #16 1 
1 remaining at 1 
1 c learing 1  
8.113 1 8.06 8.09 1 
1PE of all other I 
1 generators | 0 . 5 5  1  — 0.67 0.0 1 
1 condition j 
1 realized | = 16 = ® 
= 16 < « 
1  '"'16  ^® 
1 ^16 ° ® 
^16 ' G 1 
"16 ° ® 1 
167 
instant, virtually all of the fault-injected 
kinetic energy is absorbed by generator No. 16; 
only 0.55 pu is absorbed by all other generators 
combined. 
The Unstable Case The critically cleared but 
unstable case is analyzed in a similar fashion. 
The total kinetic energy at clearing is 11.958 pu. 
When G =0 the kinetic energy is 4.57 pu. We 1 o 
compute that the system has absorbed 
11.958 - 4.57 = 7.39 pu 
units of kinetic energy. Numerical integration 
indicates that generator No. 16 absorbed 8.06 units 
(see Figure 7-2(d)), meaning that all of the other 
generators must store -0.67 units of energy (i.e., 
they contribute 0.67 units of energy). Again, No. 
16 holds almost all of the kinetic energy that had 
been injected at clearing. The energy of all other 
machines, as a group, is virtually the same as at 
clearing (differing by only 0.67 units of energy). 
Interpolating Between the Stable and Unstable Cases 
Since the stable and unstable cases bracket the critical 
instant, we conclude that the kinetic energy absorbed by 
generator No. 16 at the critical instant is 
8.113 < K.E. < 8.06 pu 
and the kinetic energy absorbed by all other machines is 
-0.67 < KE < 0.55 pu 
(7-6) 
Table 7-1 summarizes the above calculations and, 
additionally, shows the results of interpolating. 
To fix the critical instant, we must interpolate between 
the two cases: one where cl),,=0 is realized and the other 
1 D 
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where is realized. Since the bracket of kinetic 
15 
energy in equation 7-6 is so close to zero, it is tempting to 
assurée the interpolated value (ûj^g=0, 03^^=0) is exactly zero. 
This assumption means that zero energy is absorbed by the 
stable machines and that all of the kinetic energy absorbed 
as potential energy is absorbed by machine No. 16. Though 
the exactness of this assumption may be subject to doubt, the 
maximum amount of error possible would be only -0.67 units. 
This assumption is reflected in Table 7-1, which fixes the 
kinetic energy not contributing to No. 16s motion at 3.80 
pu, and the critical energy absorbing capacity at 8.09 pu. 
This assumption confirms that the kinetic energy not 
contributing to the instability of No. 16 is the kinetic 
energy that exists at the critical instant on the critical 
trajectory. 
Summary and Conclusions Numerical integration of the 
critically stable and critically unstable Ft. Calhoun 
trajectories has yielded some interesting information. First 
a critical or stationary instant was identified for the 
stable and unstable trajectories. These instants were then 
investigated and the corresponding potential energies noted 
for each generator. By interpolating between these energy 
values, it was possible to identify the potential energy of 
each generator at the critical escape point on the critical 
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trajectory. This energy was then compared to the critical 
kinetic energy injected by the disturbance. We conclude 
that: 
1. Generator No. 16 becomes unstable when the fault 
injects more energy into No. 16 than No. 16 can 
hold. For the Ft. Calhoun fault, the energy 
required for Ft. Calhoun to become unstable is 
V^j, = 11.884 pu 
2. Not all of the kinetic energy at clearing is 
absorbed as potential energy at the critical 
instant; the kinetic energy at the critical instant 
of the critical trajectory (the instant satisfying 
the conditions is the kinetic energy 
not contributing to the instability of No. 16. For 
the Ft. Calhoun fault, this kinetic energy is 
KE = 3.80 pu 
3. At the critical instant, virtually all of the 
kinetic energy that is absorbed as potential energy 
by the system after clearing is absorbed by No. 16 
to produce instability; the total potential energy 
value of all other generators is virtually 
unchanged from the value at clearing. 
Assessing Stability 
An accurate assessment can now be made for the Ft. 
Calhoun fault. We know that, at the instant of fault 
clearing, the energy required to drive No. 16 unstable is : 
P.E. = 8.09 pu (from Table 7-1) 
We also know that, at the critical instant of the critical 
trajectory, a total kinetic energy of 
KE = 3.80 pu (from Table 7-1) 
will not contribute to instability. The kinetic energy at 
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clearing, less this kinetic energy not contributing to 
instability, must be compared to the escape energy in order 
to assess stability. For the two cases, an assessment of 
stability is shown in Table 7-2. The accuracy of the 
assessment reflects the accuracy of the potential energy 
value (found by numerical integration) and the accuracy of 
the kinetic energy value at the critical instant (found by 
simulation). 
The Nature of the Kinetic Energy Not Contributing to 
Instability 
For the simple case studied here, i.e., the case of one 
critical machine swinging with respect to the rest of the 
system, the kinetic energy not contributing to instability is 
the kinetic energy existing at the critical instant on the 
critical trajectory. It is important to take a closer look 
at this kinetic energy. Figure 7-3 shows a plot of the 
kinetic energy as a function of time for both the critically 
stable and critically unstable cases. The kinetic energy at 
the stationary point (w^g=0) is indicated on the curves. The 
interpolated value of kinetic energy, estimated for the 
critical instant when ^^^=0, is also shown (KE = 3.80 
pu) as point "A". 
It is now possible to study the nature of the kinetic 
energy that is not contributing to instability. The kinetic 
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Table 7-2. Assessment of stability at Ft. Calhoun for fault 
cleared at .3528s (stable) and .3564s (unstable) 
Stable Case: 
K.E. @ clearing 11.824 pu 
K.E. @ û = 0, 6=0 3.80 pu 
Transient energy into #16 8.02 pu 
Energy absorbing capacity of #16 8.09 pu 
Conclusion; 8.02 < 8.09, therefore stable 
Unstable Case: 
K.E. @ clearing 11.95 8 pu 
K.E. @ [3=0, ^=0 3.80 pu 
Transient energy into No. 16 8.16 pu 
Energy absorbing capacity of #16 8.09 pu 
Conclusion: 8.16 > 8.09, therefore unstable 
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Figure 7-3. K.E. vs time for the Ft. Calhoun faults cleared at .3528s (stable) 
and .3564s (unstable) 
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energy at the critical instant (03 = 0, C=0) is the kinetic 
energy not contributing to instability. 
Because the value of this kinetic energy is quite 
sensitive to the time at which the critical instant is 
reached, the actual magnitude of this kinetic energy is 
difficult to predict. This sensitivity can be deduced by-
inspecting Figure 7-3, where a small change in the time at 
which the critical instant is reached results in a large 
change in that kinetic energy which does not contribute to 
instability. In the above case, for example, we concluded 
that the critical instant (at the point marked "A") was at 
the instant when the kinetic energy which did not contribute 
to instability was 3.80 pu. If the zero velocity instant 
occurs only .05 seconds later (at the point marked "B"), the 
kinetic energy not contributing to instability increases by 
38% (from 3.80 pu to 5.23 pu). 
To make matters worse, this kind of change in the time 
of the critical instant, from point "A" to point "B", is 
exactly the kind of change that is likely to occur. That 
this change is likely can be seen by inspecting Table 7-1. 
The first row shows the kinetic energy injected by the 
disturbance. The stable and unstable values differ by only 
0.13 pu of kinetic energy. This small additional injection 
of fault kinetic energy shifts the peak-of-the-swing by 0.10 
second (see Column 6); the consequence is a large change in 
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the kinetic energy at the peak (row 3). Only 0.13 pu of 
additional fault kinetic energy resulted in a 1.27 pu change 
in kinetic energy contributing to instability. 
Thus, it appears that small 'changes may be expected to 
alter significantly the time of the peak on the critical 
trajectory; this can significantly change the kinetic energy 
and the stability of the response of an individual case. 
Implications to Direct Methods of Stability Assessment 
It appears that small system changes that are able to make 
small changes in the time of the critical instant are able to 
alter significantly the system's stability characteristics. 
In general, therefore, any single stability case can be 
expected to be sensitive to small changes in the parameters 
assumed at the start. Wide variations in predicted stability 
may result from small changes in the fault, the model, or the 
initial conditions. 
This high degree of sensitivity introduces a problem: 
valid operating decisions should not be based on a system 
response that is highly sensitive to small changes in the 
system. Wide variations in control actions would be required 
in order to respond to relatively minor changes in the 
system. Furthermore, this condition might lead to a false 
measure of security, since a small change may make a safe 
system insecure. 
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A Modified Transient Energy Margin 
The presence of a component of energy with a high degree 
of variability is not an insurmountable problem. It is 
possible to obtain a security assessment, using a modified 
transient energy margin, that is not subject to wide 
variations with small system changes. This modified margin 
assesses only the invariant portion of the kinetic energy in 
question by using a lower bound on the kinetic energy not 
contributing to instability. This lower bound is the amount 
of kinetic energy that is assured to exist. Any kinetic 
energy above this amount is subject to change and is 
therefore not used in the assessment. 
Therefore, a modified kinetic energy correction 
technique is employed: this technique uses the minimum 
kinetic energy value on the critical trajectory as the 
kinetic energy component not contributing to instability. 
This minimum kinetic energy value is the lower bound on the 
kinetic energy component not contributing to instability. In 
Figure 7-3, the lower bound is the minimum kinetic energy 
value of 
KEjjj = 2.9 07 pu 
occurring at t = 0.647 s„ (The nomenclature KE^ is used for 
the minimum kinetic energy along the trajectory.) 
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The Concept of an Energy Minimum 
using a local energy minimum value, rather than the 
exact energy value, is consistent with other techniques used 
in direct assessment of stability. The energy of the 
relevant UEP, for example, is a local minimum escape energy 
value that is used instead of the exact value of 
Assessing robustness with KE^ and v^, which are both local 
energy minimums, is equivalent to assessing the worst 
possible trajectory that is close to the actual critical 
trajectory. The technique is intended to give a reliable 
evaluation of robustness. Assessing energy, either in terms 
of position (V^) or velocity (KE^), will not be sensitive to 
the time of the actual critical instant. The assessment will 
use only the components of kinetic energy and potential 
energy that are assured to exist at the critical instant. 
This assessment methodology in effect defines robustness in 
terms of the assured energy capacity only; this is 
independent of 
o the timing of the critical instant 
o the proximity of the trajectory and the relevant 
UEP at this critical instant. 
Accuracy of Critical Clearing Time 
A consequence of such an assessment technique is that we 
can no longer expect precise predictions of the critical 
clearing times; that is, the technique cannot rank the 
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transient response precisely in terms of critical clearing 
times as was accomplished by the technique described in 
Chapter 6. This is because the minimum kinetic energy value 
will differ from the actual kinetic energy component not 
contributing to instability; this difference will vary from 
case to case. 
The technique of using local minimums, rather than actual 
energy values, in essence evaluates a local worst-case 
condition in order to assure a valid basis for decision­
making. This approach loses the precise stability predictions 
and gains a measure of locally-assured robustness. The 
important distinction to be made here is between a technique 
which accurately assesses stability and a technique which 
accurately assesses robustness. 
Example ; The Ft. Calhoun Fault 
The Ft. Calhoun fault study described in considerable 
detail in this chapter exemplifies the proposed technique. 
The critical trajectory realizes a kinetic energy not 
contributing to instability of 
KE = 3.80 pu 
(see Table 7-2). Using the minimum KE from Figure 7-3, the 
minimum kinetic energy is 
KE^ = 2.90 pu 
(where the subscript m is used to indicate the minimum kinetic 
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energy on the critical trajectory.) The proposed method of 
assessing the robustness of the system would repeat the 
assessment of Table 7-2, substituting the value of KE^ = 2.90 
pu for the value of KE = 3.80 pu. Table 7-3 shows this 
assessment for the critically stable case. The result is a 
mis-assessment of stability; the critically stable case is 
assessed as being unstable by an energy margin of -0.83 pu. 
Using the KE^ of 2.90 pu to predict critical clearing yields a 
prediction of: 
tcr = 0.3514 s 
This compares to a correct critical clearing time (see Table 
7-1) of: 
0.3528 < t^j. < 0.3564 s 
Table 7-3. Assessment of the stable Ft. Calhoun fault using 
the minimum KE on the critical trajectory (KE^) 
K.E. at clearing 11.824 pu 
KE„ 2.90 pu 
Transient energy into #16 8.92 pu 
Energy absorbing capacity 8.09 pu 
Conclusion: 8.92 > 8.09, therefore stability is NOT assured 
MARGIN: 8.09 - 8.92 = -0.83 at No. 16 
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Thus, the -0.83 pu "error" in predicting stability does not 
drastically alter the prediction of t^^. Also, it appears 
that the critical clearing time of 
0.3528 < t^j. < 0.3564 s 
is subject to some amount of variation, depending upon when 
the stationary instant actually occurs. Thus, some amount of 
the robustness implied by a critical clearing time of 
0.3528 < t^j, < 0.3564 s 
may vanish if small changes in system parameters alter the 
timing of the critical instant. Using KE^ = 2.90 pu for the 
assessment eliminates this concern and evaluates the fault by 
means of a criterion that defines robustness in terms of a 
local worst-case fault-energy-absorbing capacity. 
Re-assessment of the Three-phase Faults 
We now apply the proposed assessment methodology to the 13 
three-phase faults (in the Reduced Iowa System) that were 
presented in Chapter 6. 
The Assessment procedure 
The assessment procedure is exactly the same as presented 
in Chapter 6, except for the estimate of the kinetic energy 
correction, For this value, we use the minimum 
kinetic energy of the critical trajectory, KE^. 
The assessment procedure is, then: 
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Compute the energy margin (i.e. the energy function 
evaluated between clearing and the relevant UEP: 
AV = V 
e" 
Increase the energy margin by the kinetic energy 
correction, KE^: 
AVç' = 
e" 
(The prime notation denotes that KE is used 
instead of AKE^Q^^.) 
3. Reduce the kinetic energy at clearing by KE^: 
= KE^i - KE^ 
4. Normalize the energy margin AV ' by dividing by the 
KEg' to obtain the normalized transient energy 
margin, A I . 
àV„' = 
The alternate normalizing technique will give the 
percent margin, %AV': 
%AV' = AVJ,V(AV^' + KE^') 100% 
The Assessment 
Table 7-4 shows the results of this security assessment 
procedure as applied to the 13 three-phase faults of Chapter 
6. Table 7-5 ranks these 13 cases in order of decreasing 
robustness. 
Comparison can be made between Table 7-5 and Table 6-4 in 
Chapter 6. The ranking shown in Table 7-5 does not match 
exactly that shown in Table 6-4. However, inspection of the 
critical clearing times in Table 7-5 shows the ranking to be 
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Table 7-4. Normalized transient energy margin (using AKE^) 
for the 17-generator system; three-phase faults 
cleared at 0.15s 
Fault Location 
(Bus and Line Faulted) 
KE. 
m 
AV ' Corrected av ' 
(pu) Fault KE " 
Raun fault 
372-193 1.77 8.081 6.229 1.297 
372-773 1.63 5.265 6.368 0.827 
372-482 2.22 10.258 5.790 1.772 
Transformer 372-800 1.61 9.914 6.388 1.552 
Council Bluffs fault 
436 439 
436-771 
2.99 
1.49 
13.104 
5.233 
3.306 
4.806 
3.964 
1.089 
ft. Calhoun fault 
773-372 
773-779 
773-775 
4.63 
2 . 8 8  
3.94 
29.500 
27.745 
29.129 
1.115 
0 . 0 6  
2 4 . 8 8 3  
483.3 
Cooper fault 
6-774 
6-439 
6-16 
6-393 
2 . 1 1  
4.32 
2.89 
4.99 
4.230 
6.712 
6.057 
8.476 
4.130 
2.949 
3.379 
1.279 
1.024 
2.276 
1.793 
6 . 6 2 8  
* KE^ is larger than the fault KE in this case 
Table 7-5. Ranking of the three-phase faults shown in Table 7-4 
clearing times 
Rank AVn' %AV' AV* Fault Location stable unstable 
1 0. 027 45. 3 5., 265 Raun, line 372-773 0. 117 0. 180 
2 1. 024 50. 6 4.. 230 Cooper, line 6-774 0. 204 0. 212 
3 1. 089 52. 1 5.. 233 Council Bluffs, line 436-439 0. 200 0. 204 
4 1. 297 56. 5 8.. 081 Raun, line 372-193 0. 1923 0. 1924 
5 1. 552 60. 8 9.. 914 Raun, transformer 372-800 0. 196 0. 200 
6 1. 772 63. 9 10. 258 Raun, line 372-482 0. 192 0. 196 
7 1. 793 6 4 .  2 6.. 057 Cooper, line 6-16 0. 212 0. 216 
8 2. 276 6 9 .  5 6 .  712 Cooper, line 6-439 0. 216 0. 220 
9 3. 964 80. 0 13., 964 Council Bluffs, line 436-439 0. 225 0. 250 
10 6. 628 86. 9 8,. 416 Cooper, line 6-393 0. 220 0. 225 
11 24. 773 96. 1 2 7 .  745 Ft. Calhoun, line 773-779 0. 345 0. 356 
12 483. 30 99. 8 2 9 .  129 Ft. Calhoun, line 773-775 0. 325 0. 340 
13 * * 2 9 .  500 Ft. Calhoun, line 773-372 0. 340 0. 345 
* KE Is larger than the fault KE in this case 
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more or less the same. Though the clearing times are not in 
precise sequence, the list starts with low critical clearing 
times and increases to larger values as we move down the list. 
No case is more than about 0.02 S out of position, though the 
critical clearing values range from 0.117 s to 0.356 s. We 
conclude that the effect of using a local minimum kinetic 
energy correction may have a minimal effect on the overall 
ranking of the system; it will, however, make the ranking not 
sensitive as to the time the critical instant actually occurs. 
Comparison can also be made between Table 7-4 and Table 
6-3. Looking at column 1 it can be seen that some values 
are above the corresponding a V^ values, and some are below. 
Since AV^, * is supposed to contain a conservative estimate on 
kinetic energy, one might first think that AV^' should always 
be less than AV^» This, in fact, does not need to be the 
case. The reason is found in the difference between the two 
kinetic energy correction techniques. In Chapter 6, the 
AKE^orr values were obtained for the non-critical trajectory, 
e.g., for the trajectory cleared at 0.15 seconds. The method 
used in Chapter 7, however, obtains KE^ for the critical 
trajectory, e.g., for the Ft. Calhoun fault cleared at 0.3564 
seconds. The of the non-critical trajectory is not 
necessarily larger than the lower bound on the kinetic energy 
of the critical trajectory. Thus, the values of AKE^^^^ may 
above or below the values of KE^, and the value of AV^' may 
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likewise be below or above AV^. 
It is interesting to note that the security assessment of 
Table 7-5 (made in terms of nearby worst-case conditions) does 
not identify a weakness in any one location. The stability 
assessment of Table 6-4, on the other hand, clearly identified 
RAUN as the weak link in the system. 
The lack of a clearly defined point of weakness might 
seem reasonable. The original design process attempted to 
carefully isolate the worst-case problems and design the 
system to survive specific impacts with no part of the system 
being overdesigned relative to the other. We might conjecture 
that, if worst-case conditions are assessed (using a direct 
method), this design strategy should appear. That no single 
point of weakness is apparent may merely show that the system 
is well-designed for the worst trajectories possible in the 
current configuration. (in the assessment implied in Table 
7-5, Ft. Calhoun would appear to be over-designed for this 
particular fault and configuration.) 
Summary and Discussion 
The previous chapter. Chapter 6, computed a kinetic 
energy correction (AKE^^^^) using the speed of the critical 
group at the clearing instant. The method led to an accurate 
ranking of various faults in terms of the critical clearing 
times. In Chapter 7, a careful investigation of where the 
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energy resides after a disturbance has suggested a slightly 
different technique. Instead of we used the minimum 
kinetic energy value actually realized by the critical 
trajectory (KE^). 
Though the analysis in this chapter is somewhat detailed, 
the reader should not lose sight of the simplicity of what 
Chapter 7 proposes. The only change between Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7 is in computing the kinetic energy correction: in 
Chapter 5 the kinetic energy corrections is used as 
the kinetic energy not contributing to instability; in Chapter 
7 a lower bound is used as the kinetic energy not contributing 
to instability. 
To obtain the ranking shown in Table 7-5, we merely used 
a conservative lower bound in place of a sensitive parameter. 
using a conservative limiting value rather than an uncertain 
AKE  is intended to give an assessment that is suited for 
corr 
decision making. 
The method uses a simple logic; at the point of escape, 
the critical trajectory has both a potential energy value 
(V^j.) and a kinetic energy value (kinetic energy not 
contributing to instability); the energy of the UEP actually 
realized by the critical trajectory is taken as a safe upper 
bound on the value of the potential energy at escape, and the 
kinetic energy minimum actually realized by the critical 
trajectory is taken as a safe upper bound on the value of the 
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kinetic energy at escape. That is, the energy of the UEP is 
taken as a safe estimate of and minimum kinetic energy on 
the critical trajectory is taken as a safe estimate of the 
kinetic energy that does not contribute to instability. An 
assessment made on this basis avoids the high sensitivity of 
the kinetic energy not contributing to instability to the 
actual time the critical instant occurs, and does not require 
knowledge of the angles at the actual point of escape. 
The focus on assessing assured robustness, rather than on 
merely predicting stability is one of the more subtle results 
of Chapter 7. The distinction is an important one. To assess 
stability requires precise knowledge of exact responses. As 
such the assessment ignores the conditions that are merely 
"close-by". To assess security, on the other hand, the 
precise response is not desired. Instead, we must evaluate 
the posture of the system in terms of the worst possible 
response that is "close-by". To be considered secure the 
system must be sound in spite of the minor changes in the 
system; it must provide decisions that accommodate the minor 
ebb and flow of the system. 
This chapter has chosen to assess the local minimum 
energy conditions as a measure of security. It is reasoned 
that the local worst-case trajectory will realize these local 
minimum energy conditions. These energy minimal thus evaluate 
the local worst-case trajectory that is close to the actual 
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trajectory that will be encountered. A system is considered 
secure only if the local energy minima are safely within 
acceptable limits. 
The assessment of energy minima is the fundamental 
concept behind security assessment using transient energy 
margin analysis. The technique is well-suited to the task. 
However, more work has to be done and, in this respect, the 
technique proposed in this chapter is not an end in itself; 
rather, it is a point-of-beginning. The intent is to open a 
direction for continued study, not to claim its 
accomplishment; to focus on the concept of a decision-making 
assessment of robustness, rather than on a means of merely 
assessing stability. 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation used the normalized transient energy 
margin to establish a ranking of possible disturbances for a 
given operating condition. The ranking was confirmed in terms 
of critical clearing times to demonstrate an accurate measure 
of the relative stability of the system. The ranking is 
relative to the severity of the possible disturbances, 
measured in terms of critical clearing times. 
The dissertation suggests that a meaningful assessment of 
security requires more than just assessing stability; the 
assessment must exclude the energy components that are highly 
sensitive to change and thus unreliable for use in 
decision-making. Using local minimum energy values in^ lieu of 
of sensitive energy components, a security assessment 
methodology is proposed amd applied to a real-world test 
system. 
The resulting margin ranking gives a listing of the 
evident weak links that exist in the system at a given moment. 
It seems reasonable that an alert should be issued when the 
weakest of these links corresponds to the margin that is 
below some specified limit. The operator will most likely be 
familiar already with the problem to which he is being 
alerted. Now, he will know what his margin of safety is. He 
will be in a postion to assess the severity of the alert, and 
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to determine whether corrective action is necessary. 
The function of the transient security assessment process 
would be: 
o To alert the operator when circumstances arise that 
might need his attention. 
o To identify the margin-of-safety. 
o To report the weak links that threaten the system, 
thus suggesting corrective measures. 
The on-line security assessment process assures the operator 
that he is fully informed about the status of the system. The 
operator can ascertain how well his current operating strategy 
meets the dynamic system performance criteria in effect at the 
moment. An alert not only gives the operator knowledge that 
trouble is possible, but, by identifying the source of the 
problem, implies remedial action that will alter the 
situation. With information provided by this transient 
security assessment, the operator could control his system and 
safely operate close to the "edge" of transient stability. 
Accomplishments of This Research 
Development of the proposed methodology for automated 
transient security assessment required several advances in the 
state-of-the-art for direct methods of stability analysis. 
These advances were; 
o Defining the transient energy margin. 
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Identifying the gross motion of a group of machines 
(as indicated by their center of inertia) as the 
motion which controls stability. This led to 
developing two additional concepts: 
the controlling UEP is that UEP approached (by 
the critical group) during the critical 
trajectory. 
a substantial part of the fault energy does not 
contribute to instability (namely the kinetic 
energy associated with intermachine motion, 
about the inertial centers, at the instant when 
2=0 and 5=0). 
verifying that the energy of the controlling UEP 
may be used, for all practical purposes, as being 
equal to V^j,. 
Calculating the kinetic energy not contributing to 
instability by computing the kinetic energy 
associated with intermachine motion, around the 
inertial centers, at the clearing instant. 
Demonstrating that accurate first swing transient 
security can be assessed if: 
-- the fault energy is computed at clearing, 
including a correction for KE not contributing 
to instability, and 
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the critical energy is computed as the energy 
associated with the controlling UEP. 
Developing an assessment methodology using the 
normalized transient energy margin to produce a 
relative ranking of the disturbances. This 
methodology yields: 
a means of detecting that an unstable transient 
response is possible; 
a means of quantitatively measuring the 
robustness of the system (i.e., the 
margin-of-safety); 
— a means of identifying the evident weak links 
that exist at a given operating condition, 
implying the need for corrective measures. 
Confirming by demonstration that direct methods can 
give an analysis that is sufficiently accurate, in 
terras of comparative or relative ranking, to allow 
system operational decision-making based on the 
analysis results. 
Demonstrating, by using a practical, real-world 
test system, the potential of the proposed 
methodology for accomplishing transient security 
assessment. 
proposing a security assessment technique using the 
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minimum kinetic energy on the critical trajectory; 
this technique avoids an assessment that is highly 
sensitive to when the peak of the swing occurs 
during the critical trajectory. The approach does 
require additional computation; it may be necessary 
to ^ reproduce the critical trajectory in order to 
determine the minimum kinetic energy on the 
critical trajectory. 
In accomplishing these advancements, the research 
followed the strategy of assigning physical meaning to the 
abstract mathematical concepts implied in the energy function 
analysis. Assigning physical meaning to the unstable 
equilibrium points and to the system kinetic energy led to the 
proper use of the energy that they represented. 
Future Work 
A great deal of work needs to be done in the area of 
automated transient stability analysis. There is a large 
difference between proposing a tool for assessing transient 
stability, and accomplishing practical, computer automated, 
transient security analysis. It is the opinion of this 
researcher that future investigations into direct methods of 
transient security assessment must accomplish three principal 
goals : 
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o Develop a thorough understanding of the physical 
phenomenon of transient instability. 
o Resolve special topic issues remaining in the 
energy assessment methodology, including assurances 
of conservative results. 
o Establish a decision criterion that is generally 
accepted (at the industrial level) as valid for 
operational decision-making. 
Research Topics 
Several research topics seem appropriate as means of 
accomplishing these goals. They are introduced here as topics 
for continued research. 
o Physical distribution of energy 
It appears that we still do not know exactly what 
drives generators unstable. The research reported 
in this dissertation studied how the system fault 
energy (potential and kinetic) is distributed in 
time. An important issue still to be resolved is 
how this fault energy (potential and kinetic) is 
distributed geographically. In Chapter 7, the 
energy in each machine was computed during a fault 
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simulation using numerical integration. Only one 
machine instabilities were studied, where the mode 
of instabillity was clearly defined. The 
techniques of Chapter 7 should be applied to the 
multimachine case and cases where the mode of 
instability is not clear. The potential energy 
associated with each machine can be computed, 
giving a geographical distribution showing where 
the transient energy physically resides. A study 
of this distribution should help identify what, 
exactly, drives the machines unstable, and what 
system energy does or does not contribute to that 
instability. The introductory work in this area 
(Chapter 7) seems quite promising; what appears to 
be emerging is an understanding, on a machine by 
machine basis, of how fault injected energy drives 
individual machines or groups of machines unstable. 
The work of Chapter 7 must be continued. 
0 Energy invariant equivalent 
Chapter 7 suggested that all of the fault kinetic 
energy contributing to instability was imbedded in 
the unstable machines at the critical instant, with 
virtually no fault kinetic energy residing in all 
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other machines combined. From this it appears that 
energy storage elements (lines, transformers, etc.) 
that are remote from the fault location might, as a 
whole, contribute little to the stability of 
critically stable machines. If this were true, 
there may be a reduced need for detailed models, 
particularly for remote parts of the system. 
Energy equivalent models might be devised to 
simplify the security assessment process. Details 
of parts of the system that are not near the 
faulted generator might not be required and might 
be equivalenced. It may be possible to obtain a 
sufficient model using only knowledge of major 
lines or lines near generators where faults are 
assumed. This information may be available without 
extensive telemetering. Thus, a study of where the 
fault kinetic energy resides at the stationary 
instant may lead to identification of a significant 
amount of system data that are not essential in 
assessing security. 
o The controlling UEP 
Determining the controlling UEP is a crucial step 
in the direct assessment methodology. This 
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dissertation considered the controlling UEP to be 
the one physically realized (in terms of the 
critical group) by the critically cleared 
trajectory. It appears from this research that 
identification of the controlling UEP can be 
pre-determined through careful study. It would be 
particularly useful, however, if the critical group 
and corresponding UEP could be identified as part 
of the direct assessment methodology. This is 
clearly an area for additional research. 
o New normalizing criteria 
For each controlling UEP there is an energy margin 
which, according to the direct assessment 
methodology, is normalized to obtain a meaningful 
ranking of the disturbances. One normalizing 
scheme (dividing the kinetic energy at clearing) 
was presented in this dissertation. However, more 
work is needed in this area. New normalizing 
schemes should be considered, aimed at resolving 
the energy margin into physically meaningful 
parameters over which the operator has direct or 
indirect control. Reporting of the transient 
energy margin as physically meaningful parameters 
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would be very useful in practical application. 
Probably the most useful parameters would be: 
AP (load or generation changes allowed) 
AV (voltage changes allowed) 
— AY (admittance changes allowed) 
o Effects of exciters, power system stabilizers, etc. 
This dissertation utilized a classical model. At 
first the use of this model might seem quite 
limiting. On the other hand, the simplicity of the 
classical model is particularly appealing in 
assessing transient stability, which typically 
requires great mathematical complexity. A 
significant question is whether the simple 
classical model captures the essence of stability 
with sufficient accuracy to be a realistic basis 
for decision making. This issue questions whether 
it is better to use a thoroughly understood, simple 
model rather than the accurate but elaborate system 
models. It may be possible, for example, to 
conservatively estimate the effects of exciters, 
power system stabilizers, DC transmission lines, 
etc., on the transient energy absorbing capacity of 
the system. On the other hand, the inclusion of 
more elaborate models may be necessary for 
practical assessment of security. Only further 
research can resolve the issue. 
Two-machine equivalent 
The concept that the gross motion of two principal 
groups determines stability suggests that a 
disturbance might be viewed as two equivalent 
machines in motion. It would be interesting to 
pursue the question of developing a two-machine 
equivalent system based on the critical grouping. 
The question raised is whether conservative or safe 
assumptions can be used in resolving the n-machine 
system into a two-machine system that preserves the 
essential properties of the gross motion of the 
original system, i.e., transient stability. 
Assurance of conservativeness 
The assurance of conservative results, that use of 
the UEP traditionally offers, has been lost with 
the use of the controlling UEP and the kinetic 
energy correction. A significant question is: Can 
the assurance of conservative results be 
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re-introduced? The issue here is whether the use 
of the physically realized UEP and the physically 
realized minimum kinetic energy can be resolved 
into a least-upper-bound on system energy that is 
mathematically assured. Assurance of the 
conservative nature of the results will promote 
general acceptance of the validity of assessment 
methodology for decision-making. 
validation of the methodology 
Any method of assessing transient security must 
ultimately be tested in a field application. The 
transient security analysis methodology outlined in 
this dissertation could benefit from limited field 
testing in which the techniques can be put into a 
control center on an experimental basis. The 
methodology could establish a track record while in 
limited use. The system could be refined and 
evaluated in a carefully monitored, practical 
environment, even if the process is not fully 
automated or optimized. 
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APPENDIX: THE COMPUTER PROGRAMS 
Description of Computer programs 
Five computer programs were utilized ir. the research 
reported in this dissertation: 
PETS 
TESA 
TSWING 
UEPMARGIN 
YMOD 
The first two programs (PETS and TESA) are batch programs 
obtained from outside sources; and the last three (TSWING, 
UEPMARGIN, AND YMOD) are interactive programs developed for 
the research project of which this dissertation is a part. 
Only TSWING and UEPMARGIN were developed by the author. 
The Batch Programs 
Two computer program packages were obtained from outside 
sources at the start of this research project: 
1. The Philadelphia Electric Transient Stability 
program (PETS), and its companion loadflow program, 
was available from the power System Computer 
Service at Iowa State University. This package was 
used to simulate disturbances by time solution of 
the network; 
2. Transient Energy Stability Analysis, (TESA), was 
provided by Systems Control, Inc. The TESA progams 
estimate the unstable equlibrium angles, the 
critical energy, and the energy at the time of the 
fault clearing. Though this program was not 
specifically used to generate the data in this 
dissertation, several subroutines were used in the 
programs TSWING and UEPMARGIN. 
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These two programs operate in the batch mode on an ITEL-AS6 
computer at the Iowa State University Computer Center. 
The Interactive Programs 
In addition to the two batch-mode programs obtained from 
outside sources, three interactive-mode programs were 
developed in the course of this research. The first two, 
"TSWING" and UEPMARGIN", were written by the author. They 
•borrow several subroutines from the TESA package. The third 
program, YMOD, was developed by colleagues as an efficient 
method of generating the modified Y-Bus matrices required in 
this work. All three programs are written for 
interactive-mode operation on the VAX-780 computer system at 
Iowa State University. 
TCTtf TXT/^ 
The program TSWING simulates the disturbance by time 
simulation. At each time step it computes and plots various 
parameters. It includes the following basic features: 
''-T.putss and plots rotor angles with respect to the 
system inertial center. 
o Computes and plots the rms deviation between the 
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rotor angles and a specified set of UEP angles. 
0 Computes and plots kinetic energy, position energy, 
magnetic energy, dissipation energy, potential 
energy, and total energy. 
o Injects additional disturbances, in the form of 
additional generation or load, in any distribution 
and at any instant. 
o Generates the reduced Y-Bus matrix used in program 
UEPMARGIN. 
The basic network reduction and swing simulation are 
accomplished by subroutines borrowed from TESA. Data 
requirements for executing TSWING are documented in the 
comment cards at the beginning of the TSWING program. The 
TSWING program provides a means of inspecting energy shifts 
and the resulting trajectories for a wide range of 
disturbances. 
UEPMARGIN 
The program UEPMARGIN computes the energy function 
between any two system states, a and b, i.e., calculates v. 
When "a" is the system states (angles and velocities) at the 
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instant of clearing, and "b" is the system states at the UEP, 
then the result is the energy margin. The program also allows 
for a change in the generator powers; the program recomputes 
the UEP and computes the corresponding energy margin. 
The basic features of UEPMARGIN are; 
o Computes the SEP and UEP angles for a given system 
condition and for an initial estimate of the SEP 
and UEP. This utilizes a Davidon-Fletcher-Powel 
subroutine from TESA. 
Computes the energy function between any two points 
("a" and "b") in the state space, the speeds and 
angles of which are known: 
Energy = V 
© 
0 
o With "a" representing the speeds and angles at 
clearing, and "b" representing the UEP angle, 
computes the energy margin. 
o Computes the kinetic energy correction 
and adjusts the energy margin accordingly. 
o Computes the energy, broken down in line-by-line 
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and node-by-node fashion. This provides a complete 
dissecting of when the energy resides in the 
system. 
o Computes the new values of the UEP for any 
adjustment in generator powers; computes a new 
energy margin for this new UEP. This routine can 
be repeated any number of times, with the powers 
input via the interactive keyboard. 
The data requirements for executing UEPMARGIN are documented 
in the comment cards at the beginning of the UEPMARGIN 
program. 
YMOD 
The "YMOD" progaram performs reduction of the full Y-Bus 
matrix to the reduced Y-bus corresponding to the internal 
nodes. For a given disturbance, but for a variety of post 
disturbance networks, considerable savings in computational 
effort can be achieved if the Y-Bus of the postfault network 
can be modified directly instead of reconstructing the Y-Bus 
"from scratch". An efficient method for this has been 
developed by Mamandur (cited in 42) for use in this project. 
The method was originally applied to simulate network 
disturbances and is used here merely to achieve a more 
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efficient computation. The method stores all the necessary 
steps in the process of reduction, namely, in the form of 
triangular matrix factors of the Y-Bus matrix. Then it uses 
these triangular matrix factors to efficiently compute the 
changes to the reduced Y-Bus matrix due to various network 
disturbances such as tripping or closing of lines. 
The program uses an efficient technique to find the 
changes to the reduced Y-Bus matrix. However, the program is 
not in its most efficient form, in the sense that it does not 
exploit sparsity to the fullest extent both for storing and 
operations. 
The YMOD program can eventually replace the Network 
Reduction Subroutine now used to generate the reduced Y-Bus 
matrices for both TSWING and UEPKARGIN and be useful in 
assessment of network changes. 
The data requirements for executing YMOD are documented 
in the comment cards at the beginning of the YMOD program. In 
general, the line, transformer and bus data requirements match 
that of the program TSWING. 
State of the Programs 
Two of the computer programs developed in this project, 
TSWING and UEPMARGIN, are primarily research tools, i.e., in 
their present form they are useful only to a researcher who is 
familiar with them and is comfortable with the VAX interactive 
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computer system. The third program, YMOD, is a more general 
purpose matrix reduction program and would be suitable for 
application in other areas of research. 
All three programs are well-tested, versatile, and 
powerful. Numerous cross-checks were made on the results 
obtained by these programs. In short, they can reliably 
dissect the trajectory of a multimachine•power system in terms 
of where the energy resides in the system and investigate in 
detail the motion of groups of machines. Unstable equilibrium 
points can be obtained and transient energy margins can be 
computed with the appropriate corrections made. 
The packages are currently dimensioned for a 170-bus, 
39-raachine system. They require approximately 400 K of core 
to execute the most core-intensive steps (on an ITEL AS-6 
computer). The 170-bus, 39-machine limit can easily be 
re-dimensioned upward. For example, the 170-bus, 39-machine 
program is itself a re-dimensioned version of a 120-bus 
program. 
The main disadvantages to these programs are; 1) they 
are not well-documented, and 2) they are written for use on 
the interactive facilities at Iowa State university. They 
represent a mixed collection of routines that are well-tested, 
but do not represent a production grade research package. 
The programs YMOD and TSWING were written for use in an 
interactive mode with the researcher directing the program 
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execution from the on-line terminal. Input data files are 
mixed in an assortment of formats and locations designed to 
neet the particular need of the researcher, depending on the 
job performed (and not necessarily in a logical and easily 
understood format). Output files are created by one program 
as input to other routines. File management is not automated 
and is rather cumbersome. In short, inputs and outputs are 
device dependent and execution options are complicated. 
program YMOD, in contrast to MARGir and TSWING, was 
developed in a single development step to accomplish a 
well-focused result. Thus, it is systematically written and 
is neither device dependent nor strictly an interactive tool. 
The Davidon-Fletcher-Powel Subroutine 
The program UEPMARGIN contains a minimization routine 
known as the Davidon-Fletcher-Powel (DPP) routine (49,50). 
The DFP minimization technique is a non-linear programming 
method that uses the gradient of the objective function to 
achieve fast convergence characteristics. Though the 
technique is considered to be a second order gradient method, 
only the first derivative of the objective function is 
required. 
The DFp technique has been used since 1966 and is widely 
available as part of the standard IMSL library package at many 
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computer centers. In general, the algorithm accomplishes the 
following : 
1. Chooses a search direction (i.e., search ray) using 
the gradient of the function at the point 
2. Performs a linear minimization of the function 
along the search ray to obtain 
min [f(x. + x.] 
3. The gradient at x- and x. + x. is used to estimate 
—  1  — 1  — 1  
a second order gradient for the function at 
4. The first and second gradients of the function are 
used to choose a new search ray to apply at the 
point 
5. Return to step 2. 
Steps 2 through 5 are repeated until the absolute distance of 
x is less than some predetermined value. 
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